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INTRODUCTION M D SUMMARY 
Mixed extensions of finite two-person games (in normal form) have been 
studied thoroughly. Much less attention has been paid to the games this 
thesis is mainly concerned with: (non-cooperative) semi-infinite and 
infinite two-person games in which at least one of the players has a 
countably infinite pure strategy space (and where unbounded pay-off 
functions are allowed). With such a game one can associate a (semi-) 
infinite bimatrix (Α,Β) in the following way. The rows and columns of 
the matrices A and В correspond to the pure strategies of player I and 
player II respectively, while the number in cell (i,j) of A (or B) is 
the pay-off made to player I (or II, respectively), if in a play of the 
game, I chooses pure strategy i (row i) and II strategy j (column j). 
Of course, the present study is inspired by the well-developed theory of 
finite matrix and bimatrix games (see e.g. [25], [32], [Uo] and [ Ά ] of 
the REFERENCES). Contrary to the finite case, it is not obvious at first 
sight what is to be understood by a mixed extension of a (semi-) infi­
nite (bi)matrix game. In fact we shall introduce various mixed exten­
sions for these games and tackle the problem of the existence of values 
and (E-)optimal mixed strategies for the several mixed extensions of 
matrix games, and of 8-equilibrium points for mixed extensions of bi­
matrix games (ε > θ). 
CHAPTER I summarizes definitions and well-known facts about general two-
person games (1.1 ) and of mixed extensions of finite matrix and bimatrix 
games (1.2). Moreover, a class of games in extensive form, for which the 
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normal forms correspond to (semi-)infinite (bi)matrix games, is intro­
duced (1.3). Three generalizations are presented of theorems of ZERMELO, 
VON NEUMAHN and KUHN, concerning the strict determinateness of finite 
perfect information games (1.3.5, I.3.6, 1.3.7)· 
CHAPTER II studies mx<=-matrix games (m £ IN). For these games the c-, 
r- and f-mixed extensions are introduced (ll.l). It is proved that all 
these mixed extensions have a value, that player I has optimal mixed 
strategies, and that for player II ε-optimal mixed strategies exist 
(for each ε > θ), but not necessarily optimal strategies (II.2, II.3.5)· 
If the value of the mixed extensions of an mx^-matrix game A is finite 
and if A is one-sided bounded, then both optimal strategy spaces 0 T (A) 
and 0 T T(A) are empty or both are non-empty (II.3.7)· [0 (A) (0 (A)) 
is the optimal strategy space of player II in the c-mixed extension 
(r-mixed extension) of the matrix game A (II.3.2).] If A is upper boun­
ded and the value v(A) is -=>, then 0^ (A) = φ and (/ (Α) φ <b (II.3.3). 
The optimal strategy spaces are convex sets, 0T(A) is compact, and if 
A is bounded, then c£ (A) is the closure of 0° (A) (II.3.17, II.3.15). 
By introducing the critical number of an mx^-matrix game (II.3.8), ve 
obtain a possibility to compare the optimal strategy spaces 0 (A) and 
0 (A) with those of the finite subgames A (II.3.11). 0γ
Τ
(Α) turns out 
to be the convex hull of its countable set of extreme points (II.3.19). 
0 (A) and OJJÍA) have the same set of extreme points (II.3.23, II.3.21*). 
These extreme points can be associated with finite square submatrices 
of A (II.3.20). [For a finite matrix A extreme points of 0 (A) and 
0TT(A) were associated with square submatrices of A by SHAPLEY and 
SNOW.] It is proved that each essential pure strategy of a player is also 
an equalizer (ІІД.І, II.U.3) and an example (II.U.5) shows that (con­
trary to the finite case) equalizers are not necessarily essential pure 
strategies. [This fact conplicates e.g. the proofs of the theorems in 
II.5·] It turns out that 0 T T(A) is a polytope if the number of essential 
pure strategies of player II is finite (II.U.9)» and that 0 (A) is a 
polytope if the number of non-essential pure strategies of player II 
is finite (II.It.8). [For a finite matrix game, 0 (A) and 0 (A) are 
polytopes.] It is shown that in solving matrix games one can often (but 
not always) remove strictly dominated rows and dominating columns with­
out losing optimal strategies (ll.lt.13). In II. 5 semi-infinite matrix 
games with prescribed value and optimal strategy spaces are construc­
ted. [For finite games this was done by BOHNENBLUST, KABLIN and SHAPLEY 
and by GALE and SHERMAN.] It turns out that each non-empty compact con­
vex subset of S is a mixed optimal strategy space of player I for some 
mx=>-matrix game (II.5.1+, ΙΙ.5·5)· Furthermore, a characterization is 
given of those subsets Y of S which are a c-optimal strategy space of 
player II for some semi-infinite matrix game (II.5-T)· 
After the introduction of the notion of "weak domination" (II.6.3) an 
axiomatic characterization of the value-function on the set of all 
finite and semi-infinite matrix games is given (II.6.5, 11.6.6). We 
provide the set M of mx^-matrices with a metric (II.7-1 ) and study 
mx« 
the effect of perturbations of the pay-offs on the value and the (e-) 
optimal strategy spaces. It appears that ν : M •+ IR U {-«>} is 
/ \ · m 
continuous (II.7.2), that the multifunction CL· : M -»• S is upper 
1 т* ш 
f» 
semi-continuous (il.7.5) and that the multifunction CL· , defined on the 
set of bounded m>«=-matrices, has a closed graph (II.7-11 )· 
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CHAPTER III considers »x<=-matrix games. The c-, re-, cr-mixed exten­
sions for arbitrary "»'"'-matrix games are introduced and so are the cf-, 
fc- and f-mixed extensions of one-sided hounded »»«"-matrix games 
(III.1.2, III.1.3)· It is well-known that there exist bounded »x»-
matrix games for which the f-mixed extension has no value (III.2.1). 
The relations between the various upper and lower values are studied 
(III.2.U, III.2.7, III.2.8). It appears that for upper (lower) bounded 
matrices the various lower (upper) values are equal, and that the lower 
value v_(A) is the limit of the values v(A. ), v(A- ),... of semi-
infinite subgames (III.2.5). Each of the optimal strategy spaces of a 
mixed extension of an infinite matrix game with a value may be empty 
as well as non-empty (III.2.3). In III.2.11 the value and optimal 
strategy spaces are calculated for mixed extensions of a class of 
infinite diagonal games. [Finite diagonal games have been discussed by 
KAPLANSKY.] In III.3 various sufficient conditions for the existence of 
values for mixed extensions of infinite matrix games are given. Equali­
ties and inequalities between certain double limits (III.3.1, III.3.9) 
guarantee the existence of values for bounded matrix games. If 
V_(A ) = lim v(A ) for an upper bounded matrix A, then v_(A) exists. 
ι т.« ι 
m-+~ 
[For bounded "»«»-matrix games this was proved by WALD.] We introduce 
the notion of "A is weakly finite for player I" (ill.3.6) and prove 
that for an »x»-matrix game A which is weakly finite for player I, all 
mixed extensions have a value (III.3.7). [This generalizes results of 
WALD and TEH.] An alternative proof is given of a theorem of DULMAGE 
and PECK concerning the existence of values of "»«»-matrix games (III.3.10). 
The optimal strategy spaces of mixed extensions of «»«»-matrix games are 
convex subsets of 1 . A necessary and sufficient condition is given for 
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a subset of Y of S to Ъе the c-optimal strategy space for an "»«»-matrix 
game (III.U.7)· With the aid of the critical numbers с (A) and с (A), 
we can compare the optimal strategy spaces 0 (A) and 0 (A) with those 
of semi-infinite and finite subgames (ill.h.2, III.U.6). In III.U.5 we 
construct bounded »xoo-matrices with prescribed unique(completely mixed) 
strategies for both players (inspired by the finite analogue treated 
by KAHLIN). In III.5 the two symmetrization procedures for finite matrix 
games, studied by GALE, KUHH and TUCKER and by VON NEUMANN, are extended 
to infinite matrix games. 
As a side result we find an example of a fair symmetric »x^-matrix game 
with empty optimal strategy spaces (III.5.5)· 
In the first three sections of CHAPTER IV c-mixed extensions of (semi-) 
infinite bimatrix games and f-mixed extensions of one-sided bounded 
(semi-) infinite bimatrix games are looked at. [As far as I know nothing 
has been published about such games.] It appears that the c-mixed ex­
tension of an mx^-bimatrix game (A,B) with a bounded 3 (m € IN) has 
e-equilibrium points for each e > 0 (IV.2.1). In IV.2.3 and IV.3.5 
sufficient conditions are given to guarantee that the f-mixed extension 
of a (semi-) infinite bimatrix game has (e-) equilibrium points. If an 
»»«»-bimatrix game (A,B) with a bounded В is weakly finite for player I, 
then e-equilibrium points exist for the c-mixed extension. The effect 
of perturbations of the pay-offs of infinite bimatrix games on ε-equi-
librium points is studied in IV.3.6 and the symmetrization procedure of 
VON NEUMANN in IV.3.8. In section it of chapter IV we derive various 
E-equilibrium point theorems for two-person games outside the class of 
bimatrix games (IV.1*.2, IV.U.3, IV.U.7), where at least one of the 
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strategy spaces may Ъе non-compact. [To the best of my knowledge in all 
known equilibrium point theorems (cf. [1], [6], [18], [33], [3θ] and 
[1*1]) it is presupposed that each strategy space is compact. Inci­
dentally, for many minimax theorems this is not the case.] For the 
c-mixed extension of a two-person game on [0,1] χ [0,») with a dis­
continuity of the pay-off functions of a prescribed type on a curve, 
E-equilibrium points exist (lV.li.8). [This generalizes theorems for zero-
sum games on the unit square [0,1] χ [0,1] of KARLIN and VILLE.] Finally, 
a theorem for separable zero-sum games on [0,1] χ [0,=>) is derived 
(IV.U.I3). [Separable zero-sum games on the unit square have been 
studied by DRESHER, KARLIN and SHAPLEY.] 
CHAPTER V considers matrix games containing in their cells elements of 
a subfield к of IB (V.l.2) and tackles the problem of the existence of 
a value in k, and optimal mixed strategies for which all coordinates 
are in к (V.l.5, V.2.1, V.2.3 and V.2.1+). 
12 
NOTATIONS 
1. "W.l.o.g." is used as an аЪЪге іаііоп of "Without loss of generality". 
The end of a proof is signalled Ъу ||. 
2. For a finite set X, |x| is the number of elements of X. 
3. ПІ := IN U {»}. If m € IN, then IH := {1,2,...,m}. IN := IN, 
IH0 := I. 
U. If а,Ъ € IR, then а л Ъ := miri {а,Ъ}, a V Ъ := max {а,Ъ}. 
5. "Ж := IB U {-»,»}, (-»,»] := IR U M , [-»,») := IR U {-»}. For each 
a £ IR: -и < a < ш, а+ш = 0D+a := », a+í-") = (-»)+a := -<в, 
[а,»] := {χ e IR, a £ χ £ =>}. 
For each a € (0,°°) : a.» := «>, а.(-ш) := -«. 
ω+α>
 :
= tOj (_ш)+(_ео) := _оо
э
 о.» := 0, 0.(- ш) = 0. 
6. е.,е.,...,e are the elements of the standard basis of IR (m £ IN). 
1 ¿ m 
0 is the zero-element of IR11. 1 := ( 1 , 1 , . . . ,1 ) £ IRm. The i- th 
m 
coordinate of a vector χ £ IR is denoted by x. or (x).. For x,y £ IR 
we define: 
χ > y iff χ. > y. for each i £ IN 
— i — i m 
χ >> y iff χ. > y. for each i £ IN 
y £ χ iff χ >. y 
y << χ iff χ >> y. 
m 
If χ € IRm, then ||x|| := E |χ.|, ||x|I. :- max |x.|. 
m i-i iei\ 
S m := {p £ IRm; ρ >_ 0, Σ p. = 1}. The elements of S m are called 
i=1 1 
proЪaЪill·ty vectors (of length m). 
If q = (q.- ,q.p,... ,α ) € IR , then the transpose q. of q is the column 
• M 
vector q„ 
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(IR ) is the linear space of all columns of real numbers of length 
m. If V с IE111, then Г 1 := {χ £ IE m; х = 0 for each ν e V} . 
t m [xv := Σ x.v..] 
i=1 1 1 
If η È IR^XÍO}, then [n]+ := {x e IHm; xnt > 0}, 
[n]" := {x e IR1"; xn1 < 0}. 
IH . . . . . 
IR is the linear space of all infinite sequences of real numbers. 
ΓΝ 
The i-th coordinate of an element χ ε IR is denoted by χ. (i ε IN). 
e- is the infinite sequence with i-th coordinate 1 and all other 
coordinates 0 (i ε IN). 1,^ := (1,1,1,...), 0 := (0,0,0,...). 
For elements x,y ε IR we shall write χ >_ у (χ >> у) if χ· ^_ у. 
(χ. > у.) for each i € IN. 
ι ι 
1 . . ru . . . 
1 is the linear subspace of IR consisting of those infinite 
CO 
sequences χ = (χ ,x„,...) for which llxll- := Σ |x.| < ». 
1 м м І = 1 
S : = { q e i ; q > _ 0 , | Ы |., = 1 Ь The elements of S are called 
probability vectors in 1 . 
1 c . 1 . . 
(1 ) consists of those elements q ε 1 for which there is an η ε ΓΝ 
such that q. = 0 for each j ε I M M N . S c := S П (l ) c is the set of 
compact probability vectors. 
Let πι,η € TN. An mxn-matrix with the real number a. . in the (i,j)-th 
ι s J 
cell (<= / i < m, « ^  j < n) is denoted by [a. . ] . , " , . The element 
_ _
 i.O 1=1,0=1 
in the (i,j)-th cell of a matrix A (B) is denoted by a. . (b. . ) . 
ι >0 1 > 0 
0 := [ 0 ] . , · , , J := [ 1 ] . , ." . M i s t h e s e t of r e a l mxn-
1=1,0 = 1 ' i = 1 , j = 1 mxn 
m a t r i c e s . 
The elements of M are called infinite matrices and the elements 
cexoe • 
of M and M (m,η € IN) semi-infinite matrices. 
If Α,Β ε M , then A > В means: a. . > b. . for each i ε I H M » } 
mxn' — ι,ο
 —
 i»0 m ' 
and each j € Г И \ { « } . 
lit 
If A = [a. . ] ? , ? , e M , then the transpose [a. .]? ™ , € M 
i,j 1=1, j = 1 mxn' ^ I,J JJ=1,I=1 n^m 
is denoted Ъу A . 
An ordered pair (A,B) of matrices A and В of the same size is called 
a bimatrix. Instead of ([a. . ] . , . ., [b. . ] . , . ,) we also write i,j 1=1,0 = 1' i,jJi=1 ,j = 1 
[(ai,j'bi,j)]?=i,j=i· 
We shall say that a matrix A 6 M is bounded (upper bounded . lower 
bounded) if there exists а с € IR such that la. .| < c ( a . . < c , 
' i.j' i,J 
a. • > c) for each i e INXÍ»} and j € ГИ\{<»}. A matrix A is called 
i,0 m η 
one-sided bounded if A is upper or lower bounded. 
If A e M (m € IN) and η e ΓΗ, then A := [a. .]^ . ? ,. 
mx°° η ι,ο i=1,o = l 
If A € M and m,η £ IN, then 
CDXOO 
А := [а. .] . , . , . 
m,- ι,ο 1=1,0=1' 
А :=[а. .] . , ., and А :=[а. .] . . . . . 
»,η ι,ο і=1,0 = 1 т5п ι,ο і=1,о = 1 
η ΓΝ ΓΝ η 
9. а : IH -»-ΙΕ and s : IK -»-IR are the maps defined by 
a an(x1,x2,...,xn) := (x1,x2,...,xn,0,0,...) for each χ € IRn, 
sn(x1jXg.Xj,...) := (x1,x2,...,xn) for each χ e IB . 
a. : IR -»• IH and s . : Ι Η •* IB ( m > k ) are the maps defined by 
К. y ΠΙ Ш } іь "^ 
\ m''*-!'^'"''^ : = ^X1 'x2'··· ' x k'
0
'
0
>·· •»
0) (x € IE ), 
s m , k ( x 1 ' X 2 " - " x m ) := Ц.^·····^  ( x € I R m>· 
10. Let V be a linear space (over IR) and let С с V. Then the convex 
hull and the linear hull of С are denoted by ch(C) and lh(C) respec­
tively. The set of extreme points of a convex set С с V is denoted by 
ext(C). 
11. Let <Χ,τ> be a topological space and С с X. Then the closure of С 
is denoted by cl(C) or by C. 
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CHAPTER I 
PRELIMINAHIES 
i l . D e f i n i t i o n s a n d w e l l - k n o w n f a c t s 
1.1 A two-person game (in normal form) is an ordered quadruplet 
<X,Y,K1,K->, in which X and Y are non-empty sets and 
K1 : Χ χ Y •* IR, K 2 : Χ χ Y ->· IB functions on the Cartesian pro­
duct X x Y with values in IB := IR U {-=,•»}. 
X and Y are called the (pure) strategy spaces of player I and play­
er II respectively; the elements of X (Y) are called (pure) stra­
tegies of player I (li). K.. is called the pay-off function of play­
er I in the game and Kp the pay-off function of player II. 
1.2 Such a game is played as follows. Two players,called I and II, 
choose, independently of each other, an element χ of X and an ele-
menty of Y respectively; then a pay-off K..(x,y) is made to player I 
and a pay-off Kp(x,y) to player II. 
1.3 If Ki + K2 = 0 ^от a two-person game <X,Y,K1,K2>, then we call the 
game a two-person zero-sum game and we denote it by the triplet 
<X,Y,K> where К := К- = -К^. 
1.1* We call a two-person game <X,Y,K1,Kp> finite (infinite) if both 
strategy spaces are finite (countably(!) infinite) sets; and semi-
infinite if one of the strategy spaces is finite and the other one 
countably infinite. 
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1.5 Let <X,Y,K1,K„> Ъе a two-person game and ε a positive real number. 
Then a point (x*,y*) £ X x Y is called an equilibrium point of the 
game if 
К (x*,y*) = пах К (x,y*), К (x*,y*) = max К (x+.y); 
x€X yeY 
and an ε-equilibrium point if 
КЛх*,у*) > sup К (x,y*)-
e
, К (x*,y*) > sup К (x*,y)-
e
. 
χ€Χ yeY 
The set of equilibrium points of <X,Y,K1,Kp> is denoted by 
ΕίΧ,Υ,Κ-,,ΐΟ and the set of t-equilibrium points by Εε(Χ,Υ,Κ ,Κ«) . 
1.6 Let <X,Y,K> be a two-person zero-sum game and ε a positive real 
number. Then a point (x*,y*) £ Χ χ Y is called a saddle-point of 
<X,Y,K> if for each χ € X and each y € Y: 
K(x,y*) < K(x*,y*) < К(х*,у); 
and an г-saddle-point of <X,Y,K> if for each χ £ X, у € Y: 
K(x,y*)-e £ К(х*,у*) <_ К(х*,у)+
Е
. 
The set of saddle-points of <X,Y,K> is denoted by S(X,Y,K) and the 
set of ε-saddle-points by S (Χ,Υ,Κ). 
Note that SÍX.Y.K) = Ε(Χ,Υ,Κ,-Κ), Se(X,Y,K) = Ee(X,Y,K,-K) for each 
ε > 0. 
1.7 Let <X,Y,K> be a two-person zero-sum game. Then 
v(X,Y,K) := sup inf K(x,y) 
xex yeY 
is called the lower value and 
νίΧ,Υ,Κ) := inf sup K(x,y) 
yeY xex 
the upper value of <X,Y,K>. 
Trivially, v(X,Y,K) e TR, ν(Χ,Υ,Κ) e IR and 
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ν(Χ,ϊ,Κ) < ν(Χ,Υ,Κ). 
If ν(Χ,Υ,Κ) = ν(Χ)Υ,Κ), then we say that the game has a value 
v(X,Y,K) := 7(X,Y,K). 
The elements of the set 
0 (Χ,Υ,Κ) := {χ* £ X; K(x*,y) >_ ν(Χ,Υ,Κ) for each у £ Y} 
are called (pure)maximin strategies of player I. In the case that 
<X,Y,K> has a value, the elements of 0T(X,Y,K) are called (pure) 
optimal strategies of player I. 
The elements of the set 
O-j.-j.tX.Y.K) := {y* e Y; K(x,y*) <, ν(Χ,Υ,Κ) for each χ e Χ} 
are called (pure) minimax strategies of player II; if <X,Y,K> has a 
value, then 0
 T(X,Y,K) is called the (pure) optimal strategy space 
of player II. 
1.Θ Let <X,Y,K> be a two-person zero-sum game with a value ν € IR. 
Let ε Ъе a positive real number. 
Then the elements of 
Ο^(Χ,Υ,Κ) := {χ* e X; K(x*,y) >_ v-ε for each у e Y} , 
Oj (Χ,Υ,Κ) := {y* e Y; KU,y*) <. ν+ε for each χ e X} 
are called ε-optimal strategies of player I and of player II respec­
tively. 
1.9 For a two-person zero-sum game <X,Y,K> with a real-valued pay-off 
function, the following two assertions are equivalent. 
(1) <X,Y,K> has a finite value (i.e. ν(Χ,ϊ,Κ) € IR). 
(2) For each ε > 0 : Se(X,Y,K) φ φ. 
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1.10 For a two-person zero-sum game the following three assertions are 
equivalent. 
(1) max inf K(x,y) and min sup K(x,y) exist and are equal. 
xex yeY y€Y xex 
(2) There are ν € IR, χ* £ X, y* £ Y such that 
K(x*,y) >_ ν for each у £ Y, 
K(x,y*) <. ν for each χ e X. 
(3) S(X,Y,K) φ i. 
[For a proof, see e.g. [56] p.305.] 
1.11 Let <X,Y,K> be a two-person zero-sum game with value v. 
Then 
(1) S(X,Y,K) = O I(X,Y,K) χ O I I(X,Y,K). 
If ν e IR, then for each ε > 0 : 
(2) Ο^(Χ,Υ,Κ) χ Ο^Χ,Υ,Κ) cS2e(X,Y,K), 
(3) Se(X,Y,K) с 0^ε(Χ,Υ,Κ) χ Ο^ίΧ,Υ,Κ), 
and 
(1+) 0
τ
(Χ,Υ,Κ) = Π Ο^(Χ,Υ,Κ), 0 (Χ,Υ,Κ) = Π 0^ (Χ,Υ,Κ). 
ε>0 1 ε>0 
In view of (i), (2) and (З) the problem of the existence of saddle-
points (ε-saddle-points for each ε > O) for a two-person zero-sum 
game can be reduced to the problem of the existence of optimal 
strategies (e-optimal strategies for each ε > 0) for both players. 
[With two-person non-zero-sum games we do not have such a situa­
tion. ] 
1.12 Let <X,Y,K> be a two-person zero-sum game. Let <Y,X,L> be the two-
person zero-sum game with 
L(y,x) := -K(x,y) for each у £ Y and each χ € X. 
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Then 
7(X,Y,K) = -v(Y,X,L), νίΧ,Υ,Κ) = -v(Y,X,L), 
0I(X,Ï,1C) = OJJÍY.X.L), 0II(X,Y,K) = OjÍY.X.L). 
1.13 A two-person game <X,Y,K1,K > is called a symmetric game if 
X = Y, K^x.y) = K2(y,x) for each χ € X, y € Y. 
A two-person zero-sum game <X,X,K> is symmetric if 
K(x1 ,x2) = -K(xo.x-i) for each x1 ,x2 £ X. 
If a symmetric two-person zero-sum game <X,X,K> has a value, then 
the value is equal to zero and 0T(X,X,K) = 0 (Χ,Χ,Κ). 
l.lU Let <X,Y,K1,K„> be a two-person game.Then the symmetric two-person 
game <X x Υ, Χ χ Y.L^L^, with 
L^íx.yí.Cx'.y')) := K^x.y'í+K^x'.y) , 
Lgííx.yJ.íx'.y1)) := Kgíx.y'í+K^x'.y) 
for each (χ,y)»(χ1,y') £ Χ χ Υ, is called the von Neumann symme-
trization of the game <Χ,Υ,Κ1,Κ >. 
[Cf [?] p.77 and [Ul] p.808.] 
Note that 
(а,Ъ) e E(X,Y,K1,K2) iff ((а,Ъ),(а,Ъ)) G E(XxY,XxY,L1,L2). 
1.15 Let <X,Y,K> be a two-person zero-sum game. Let а,Ъ £ IF, a > 0 and 
let L := aK+b. Then 
v(X,Y,L) = av(X,Y,K)+b, v(X,Y,L) = av(X,Y,K)+b, 
OjCx.Y.L) = OjiX.Y.K), Ojjtt.Y'.L) = OJJCX.Y.K), 
-1 -1 
0^(X,Y,L) = 0^a (Χ,Υ,Κ), O^CX.Y.L) = 0 ^ (Χ,Υ,Κ). 
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1.16 A two-person zero-sum game <X,Y,K> i s ca l l ed f a i r i f i t has value 
zero . 
For each game <X,Y,K> with a f i n i t e value v , we can find a f a i r 
game <X,Y,L> with the same (e-) optimal s t r a t e g y spaces for both 
p l a y e r s . [Take L(x,y) := K(x,y)-v for each (x ,y) £ X x Y.] 
§2. T h e m i x e d e x t e n s i o n o f f i n i t e m a t r i x 
g a m e s a n d f i n i t e b i m a t r i x g a m e s 
2.1 Let m,n € IN. Let A = [a . , ] ? _ , , _ , , В = [Ъ. .]?_ ?_ Ъе ( r e a l ) 
mxn-matrices. Then the finite two-person game <ΓΝ ,ΙΝ ,Κ,,K„> with 
m η ι 2 
КЛі.а) := a. ., K„(i,j) := b. . for each i e ІИ^, j € INn, 
is called the (finite) bimatrix каше corresponding to the matrices 
A and В and this game is denoted by (A,B). The matrices A and В 
are called the pay-off matrices of player I and player II respec­
tively. 
The finite two-person zero-sum game <IM »IH
n
»K..>, with K- as above, 
is called the (finite) matrix game corresponding to the matrix A 
and is denoted by A. 
For obvious reasons players I and II in the games (A,B) and A are 
also called row player and column player. 
2.2 Clearly, a finite two-person game <Χ,Ϊ,Κ1,Κ2>, with real-valued 
pay-off functions, can be transformed into a bimatrix game by num­
bering the elements of X and Y. 
2.3 Let A = [a. J™ ?_. , В = [b. .]* ? be mxn-matrices (m,n € IM). 
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Then the two-person game <S ,S ,£.,£>, with 
A li 
m η E.(p,q) := pAq = Σ Σ p.a. .q. 
Α
 i=i j=i 1 ^J J 
m η 
E„(p,q) := pBqt = Σ Σ р.Ъ. .q 
i-1 j=1 1 х'* J 
for each ρ 6 S , q Ε S , is called the mixed extension of the 
m 
(finite) bimatrix game (A,B). [Sm := {p e IEm; p>.0, Σ ρ· = 1}.] 
i=1 1 
We denote this game Ъу M(A,B) or, carelessly, by (A,B). The ele­
ments of S (S ) are called mixed strategies of player I (II). 
The two-person zero-sum game <S ,S ,E >, with E.(p,q) := pAq for 
each p € S , q Ê S > i s called the mixed extension of the (finite) 
matrix game A. 
Let (AJE) Ъе an mxn-bimatrix. A mixed strategy (p., ,ρ«,... ,p ) € S 
can be realized by using a chance mechanism which chooses an ele-
ment of IN (a row) in such a way, that (row) i is chosen with 
probability p. (i € ΓΝ ). 
ι m 
If, in a play.player I uses the mixed strategy ρ = (p1 ρ ) and 
player II uses (independently) the mixed strategy q = (q.,,...,q^, 
then E.(p,q) and Kjpjq) can be interpretated as expected pay-offs 
for I and II respectively. It is clear that we can identify a pure 
strategy i € ΓΝ of player I with the mixed strategy e. € S . 
Let (A,B) be an mxn-bimatrix game (m,n ε IN). 
Instead of E (M(A,B)), Е(М(А,В)) we shall from now on write 
EE(A,B), E(A,B). 
Value and optimal strategy spaces of the mixed extension MÍA) of 
a finite matrix game A are denoted by v(A), 0 T ( A ) , 0 (A). 
6 We quote the minimax theorem of J. VON NEUMANN: 
Let A b£ ti finite mxn-matrix game. Then M(A) has ji value, and 
OjCA) / «5, 0II(A) φ i. 
[in view of 1.1.11 (l) and 1.1.10 for such a game we have 
« t . . t 
m m max pAq. = max min pAq. 
qesn pesm pes111 qesn 
which explains the name of the theorem.] 
The first proof of this theorem appeared in [39]· For other proofs 
we refer the reader to [9], [10], [20], [31], [3U], [Uo] , 
[1*2], [U9], [62], [66]. The theorem is also a special case of the 
minimax theorems treated in [13], [lU], [19], [22], [2U], [27], 
[28], [36], [1»5], [M], [SO], [51], [SS], [58]. In view of the 
last remark of 1.1.6 and 1.1 .10, von Neumann's theorem follows al­
so from the equilibrium point theorem of J. Nash, quoted in I.2.7. 
7 The (two-person version of the) equilibrium point theorem of 
J.F. NASH reads as follows: 
Let (A,B) be an mxn-bimatrix game (m,n e ΓΝ). Then E(A,B) Φ φ. 
For proofs we refer the reader to [38] and [37]. The theorem is 
also a special case of the equilibrium point theorems derived in 
[1] p.72, [6], [18], [ЗЗ], [1*1]. 
8 It is well-known that for an mxn-matrix A (m,n e IN) the optimal 
strategy spaces 0T(A), 0 T T(A) are polytopes (i.e. convex hulls of 
finite sets) in S ,S . This follows e.g. from the results in [6l]; 
and also from a theorem of L.S. SHAPLEY and R.N. SNOW [U7], which 
we quote here for later reference: 
Let A e M (m,η e IN). Let ρ € 0
Τ
(Α), q € 0
ΤΤ
(Α). 
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Then the following; two assertions are equivalent: 
(1) ρ € extíOjU)), q, e extíOjjÍA)). 
(2) There exists a square submatrix К of A such that 1 adj(K)l φ 0 
л. К 
and 
р
к
 = (1K adj(K)l^)"1 1 К adj(K), q^ = (1 K adj(K)l^)"1 adj(K)l*, 
v(A) = det(K)(lK adj(K)lJ)"1. 
[Here ρ„, 1
v
 (q ,1 ) are the vectors obtained from p, 1 (q ,1 ) by 
л. л. л. л. ш η 
removing the coordinates corresponding to the rows (columns) of A 
which play no role in K; the matrix adj(K) is the adjoint of K.] 
I n f i n i t e t w o - p e r s o n g a m e s i n e x t e n ­
s i v e f o r m 
1 This section has an informal character (and can be skipped without 
losing the thread of the argument). For a formal treatment of the 
concepts used here and their motivation we refer the reader to 
H.W. Kuhn's paper [29], to J. von Neumann and 0. Morgenstern's 
book [1+0] and to chapter 2 of [kk] . 
2 In his pioneering paper [39], J· von Neumann gave a formal des­
cription of a class of zero-sum games in extensive form (in which 
most parlour games could be accounted for), introduced the notion 
of (pure) strategy for such games, and showed that such a game can 
be reduced to a finite zero-sum game in normal form (and thus to a 
finite matrix game if the number of players is two). 
3 In [29], Kuhn presented a new formulation of η-person games (n >_ 2) 
in extensive form which covered a larger class of games than the 
class considered Ъу J. von Neumann. The corresponding normal forms 
of Kuhn's games are finite (not necessarily zero-sum) games. 
Kuhn proved that (the normal form of) a perfect information game 
has an equilibrium point in pure strategies. This generalized 
theorems of J. von Neumann [ho] and E. Zermelo [65]. 
3.k Without going into details, we want to look at a class of two-per­
son games in extensive form Ъу modifying the huilding up of Kuhn's 
§1 in [29] as follows. We shall restrict our attention to two-per­
son games for which the game tree is bounded (this is automatical­
ly the case for Kuhn's games) but we allow that a player has in­
formation sets with a countably infinite number of alternatives. 
Let us again call such a game a two-person game in extensive form, 
and let us say that such a game is a semi-infinite (infinite) two-
person game in extensive form if 
(1) both players have only finitely many information sets, 
(2) exactly one (both) of the players has (have) at least one in­
formation set with a countably infinite number of alternatives. 
We are interested in such games on account of the following reason. 
If we adopt the concept of pure strategy from §3 of [29], then 
quite obviously the normal form of a (semi-) infinite two-person 
game in extensive form is a (semi-) infinite two-person game in 
normal form which can be transformed into a (semi-) infinite bi-
matrix game. [Presuppose that the pay-off functions are one-sided 
bounded if there are chance moves.] 
Clearly, one can construct many parlour games that can be reduced 
to a (semi-) infinite game in extensive form. For an example, look 
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at the following game. Let S c T N j m C I M . In a play player I takes 
an element i £ IN visible for player II; then player II takes an 
m 
element j € IN, j > i; afterwards player I (II) pays one unit to 
player II (l) if i+j € S (i+j í S). 
This game can be reduced to a semi-infinite zero-sum game with 
perfect information, in which player I has m pure strategies and 
player II countably infinitely many. 
We invite the reader to prove the assertions about perfect infor-
mation games made in the next three subsections; they will not be 
used any further. 
3.5 One can prove (by induction with respect to the height of the game 
tree) that a two-person perfect information game with bounded pay-
off functions has for each ε > 0 (pure) e-equilibrium points. 
[This assertion can also be derived from the work of C. Berge [2], 
who takes another approach to games in extensive form.] 
3.6 A two-person zero-sum perfect information game with a one-sided 
bounded pay-off function has a value (and if the value is a real 
number, then also ε-optimal pure strategies exist for each ε > 0). 
[For bounded pay-offs this was also proved in [k] p.19·] 
3.7 A zero-sum two-person game with perfect information, without chance 
moves, has a value, even if the pay-off functions are unbounded. 
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CHAPTER I I 
SEMI-INFINITE MATRIX GAMES 
§ 1 . M i x e d s t r a t e g i e s o f s e m i - i n f i n i t e 
m a t r i x g a m e s 
1.1 The purpose of t h i s sec t ion i s t o define mixed extensions of mx»-
and »xn-matrix games (m,n € IN). In view of 1.1.12 we mostly r e s -
t r i c t ou r se lves , in our de f in i t i ons and theorems, t o mx<«>-matrix 
games. 
1.2 Let us f i r s t look a t the 2x<=-matrix 
1 _1 2 - 2 1+ - 1 * 8 -Θ ... 
-1 1 - 2 2 -k k -Θ 8 ... 
Remember that S:={<iei;<l>.0, llqll^l}. Let 
q := (2"1,0,1*"1,0,8"1,0,1б"1,...) € S, 
r := (0,2~1,1Γ1,0,0,θ~1,ΐ6~Ί,0,0,32-1,...) e S and 
Ρ := (1,1) e S2. 
Then (pA)q. = 0, Aq. • ("j-") and p(Aq ) and Ar are meaningless. 
So it will be clear that we cannot use all elements of S as mixed 
strategies for player II in an mx^-matrix game. 
1.3 Let A = [a. . ] . i.J i=1,j = 1 be an mx^-matrix (m € IN). Then 
S := {q € S; Σ a. .q. £ [-=»,») for each i £ IN } 
j = 1 1" ] J m 
is called the set of restricted mixed strategies of player II in the 
matrix game A. 
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A 
The following remarks can Ъе made about S . 
(a) pUq*) = (рА)(і £ IR U {-»} for each ρ € Sm and each q. e SA. 
(b) SC с SA. [Remember that S c = S П (l1)0.] 
д 
(c) S is a convex subset of S. 
(d) If S / S , then S is not a closed subset of S (with respect to 
the 1 -norm): if q 6 S\S , then lim q(n) = q where 
η 
•;=i J 
η-*» , 
q(n) := (q^qp,...,^,! - Σ сь.О.О,...) e 3° с S 
А . J"1 
[Note that S is dense in S.] 
(e) If S í¿ S, then S is not an open subset of S: if q € S\S and 
r £ SC с S A, then (l-e)q + εΓ € S\SA for each ε € (0,1). 
(f) If A is an upper bounded matrix, then S = S (and conversely). 
(g) For each q € S the function ρ ·-* pAq (p e S ) is an upper 
m 
semi-continuous function on S . 
с 
• The elements of S tire called compact mixed strategies of play­
er II in the matrix game A. It is clear that (pA)q = p(Aq ) 
for each ρ e S m, q € Sc. 
1.1* Let A £ M (m £ IN). The two-person zero-sum game <Sm>Sc,E,> with mx» A 
E.(p,q) := pAq for each ρ £ S and each q € Sc 
is called the c-mixed extension of the matrix game A and the game 
<Sm,SA,EA> with EA(p,q) := pAq1 for each (p,q) € S™ x SA the r-
mixed extension of A. 
1.5 If A € M (m € ΓΝ) is lower bounded, then we have 
p(Aq ) = (pA)q £ IR U {»} for each ρ £ З ш and each q € S. For such 
a matrix game A we call <Sm,S,E.> with E.ip.q) := pAq* (p £ Sm, q £ S) 
the (full mixed extension or) f-mixed extension of A. 
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1.6 Let η e IH, A e M . Let 
œxn 
OD 
S, := {pes; I p.a. . e (-»,»] for each j e r a } . 
Then <S ,Sn,E > with E (p,q) := рАд (ρ € S , q С Sn) is called the 
r-mixed extension of the "Xn-matrix game A. 
52. M i x e d e x t e n s i o n s o f s e m i - i n f i n i t e 
m a t r i x g a m e s h a v e a v a l u e 
2.1 In this section we prove that all introduced mixed extensions of an 
mxm-matrix game (m £ IN) have a value and that the values of the 
different mixed extensions are equal. Further we show that for each 
mixed extension, the (mixed) optimal strategy spaces of player I 
are non-empty and equal and that player II has e-optimal mixed stra­
tegies (for each ε > 0) in the case that the value is finite. 
2.2 THEOREM 
Let A = ta. .I1? , *? , e M (m € IM). For each η С IN let 
A := la. .J. , . 
η 1,0 1=1,0 = 1 
Then : 
(1) lim V(A ) exists and is unequal to ». ν := lim v(A ) is the va-
lue of the zero-sum games <Sm,Sc,EA> and <S
m
,SA,EA>. 
(2) OjtsP.S0^) = 0I(Sm,SA,EA) / t . 
(3) For each с С IE with с > ν there is a q e S such that 
sup pAq < с. 
p€Sm 
Proof: (a) We remark that v(A1),v(A_),... is a non-increasing se-
quence of real numbers because for each η e IN 
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v(A .) = min . max pA ,,α < min ., max pA ..q 
n+l' n+1 „m F n+14 - ,
 n n n
\
cc
n+1 ,„m ^ n+1 4 
= min max pA q = v(A ). 
qes n pes m n 
Hence ν := lim v(A ) exists and is an element of IE U {-»}. 
η 
(b) Take а с € IH such that с > v. Then we can find an η € IN such 
that v(An) < c. Take a q = (q., ,q2,. .. .qj e O ^ A j (/ φ by 1.2.6). 
Let q := (<i1 ,q2,.. . ,qn,0,0,.. . ) € S0 . Then 
7(Sm,Sc,E.) < sup^ рАа = sup
m
 pA^q* = v(A) < с 
A — m (.„m η η pes ρ€Ξ 
So we have proved (З). Further we can conclude that v(S ,S ,E.)<v. 
(c) Suppose that ν = -». Then v(Sm,SC,EA) = -» in view of (b) and 
1.1.7, and 0I(S
m
,SC,EA) = S
m
 ,ί Φ. 
(d) Suppose that ν € IR. 
For each η € IN take a p e 0 (A ). Because S is compact, the se-
1 2 3 . . n(l) n(2) n(3) 
quence ρ ,p ,p ,... has a subsequence ρ ,p ,p ,... conver-
m с 
ging to some ρ e S . Let q e S and let s e IN be such that q. = 0 
J 
for each j > s. Take a k 0 € IN with n(k ) > s. Then 
Р
п(к
 = Р
п(к
Ч(к)зп(к)^^ i * < W - v f o r e a c h k - v 
[ s
n ( k ) ( < l t ) : = ^'4 Vk/·1 
^.t n(k)t с 
But then pAq = lim ρ Aq >^  ν for each q € S ; 
к-*» 
v(Sm,SC,E.) >_ inf pAq* >_ A v. qes с 
In view of (b) and I.1.7 we can conclude now that v(S ,S ,E.) = ν 
and that ρ e 0I(S
m
,SC,EA) / φ. 
(e) v(Sm,S ,Ε.) <_ v(Sm,SC,E.) = ν because SC с S , and it is easy 
to show that 
v(Sm,S ,E.) = sup inf pAe. = sup inf pAq = v. 
A
 pes m jera 0 pes m qesc 
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ш. А 
Hence, in view of 1.1.7. we have v(S ,S ,E ) = v. Further 
0I(S
m
,SA,EA) = {p € Sm; рАа > ν for each q £ S
A} = 
= {p € S ; pAe. >_ ν for each j 6 IH} = 
J 
= {p £ Sm; pAq.* > ν for each q 6 3°} = O^S^S 0 ,E ) . | | 
2.3 In view of II.2.2 (3) we immediately have the following 
COROLLARY 
For each mixed extension of ал mx^-matrix game (m e IN) with a fi­
nite value player II has e-optimal mixed strategies for each ε > 0. 
2.h The proof of the following theorem is left to the reader (see (e) 
of the proof in II.2.2). 
THEOREM 
Let А Ъе a lower bounded nix»-matrix. 
Then v(Sm,S,EA) = v(S
m
,SC,EA), O ^ . S . E ^ = O ^ s ' V .Ед). 
2.5 REMARKS 
(1) A. Wald proved in [58] p.281+ that the f-mixed extension of a 
bounded mx^-matrix game has a value. This result was also ob­
tained by E. Marchi in [31*] p.2U2. 
m A 
(2) The zero-sum game <S ,S ,E > does not satisfy the assumptions 
in the minimax theorems mentioned in 1.2.6 if the mx^-matrix A 
is unbounded. 
(3) That the c-mixed extension of an A € M (m 6 IM) has a value 
mx» 
can also be derived from the minimax theorems of F.Terkelsen 
(p.1+09 of [51]) and H. König ([28] p. 1*86); and from theorem 3 
in [U5] (take X = Ш , ¥ = TN, f(i,j) = a. . for each i € Ш , 
m i,j m 
j € IN and provide X with the discrete topology). 
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§3. O p t i m a l s t r a t e g y s p a c e s o f m i x e d e x -
t e n s i o n s o f s e m i - i n f i n i t e m a t r i x 
g a m e s 
3.1 The purpose of this section is to study the structure of the mixed 
optimal strategy spaces of the various mixed extensions of an mx»-
matrix game A (m £ IN), and the relation with the optimal strategy 
spaces of the mixed extensions of the finite suhmatrix games A . 
3.2 In view of II.2.2 and II.2.h we shall from now on denote the value 
of the mixed extensions of an mxœ-matrix game A by v(A); instead of 
0I(Sm,SC,E ), 0 (Sm,SA,EA) (and 0 (Sm,S,E ) if A is lower bounded) 
we shall write C^U). Instead of 0„(S^S^E.), 0 (Sm,SA,EA) (and 
0 (Sm,S,E ) if A is lower bounded) we shall write 0^ (A), 0^ (A) 
(and 0. (A)) respectively. 
Note that O ^ U ) с O ^ U ) (= O ^ U ) if A is lower bounded); 
O ^ U ) = O ^ U ) η Sc. 
3.3 It is easy to see whether or not v(A) = -•= for an upper bounded 
mx=>-matrix game A: 
THEOREM 
Let A € M (m £ IN) and suppose that A is upper bounded. Then 
(1) v(A) = -» iff inf a. . = -» for each i € IN . 
jera ^ 
(2) If v(A) = --, then 0° (A) = φ and 0^ (Α) φ φ. 
Proof: (a) Suppose that there is an i- £ IN such that inf a. . £ IK. 
0 m
 jera V J 
Then 
v(A) >_ inf. E (e. ,q) = inf E (е. ,e.) = inf a. . e IR. 
qes A 1ο jera A -^o J jera ^-o'0 
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Hence V(A) = -» implies that inf a. . = -» for each i € ΓΝ . 
(D) We shall now prove that for a sequence a^ap,... of real numbers 
Ш 
with inf a. = -», there is a q. £ S such that Σ a.q. = -». Take a 
jeiH J j=i J J 
subsequence n(1),n(2),... of l,2,3j... such that a / ^  < -2 for 
each к € IM. 
-к 
Let q £ S be such that α^/
ν
\ = 2 for each к £ ΓΝ and q. = 0 for 
the other coordinates. Then 
Σ a.q. = Σ a ,1\q_/, ч < Σ (-1) = -». 
j-1 J J k=i ъМ^Ы -k=i 
(c) Suppose now that inf a. . = -» for each i € ΓΝ . 
jera 1 , J 
Let e := sup {a. .; i € IN , j € IN} € IE. In view of (b) we can 
ι, j m 
for each i 6 IN take a q € S such that e.A(q ) = -<=. Let 
q := m Σ q . Then e.Aq = m e.A(q ) + m - Σ e.A(q ) <_ 
i=1 1 1 гега\{і} 1 
m 
m
-
 e.A(q ) + m" (m-l)e = -» for each i £ ΓΝ . So v(A) = -». 
ι ·^ m 
Thus we have proved (1). 
(d) Suppose now that v(A) = -<=. Take q as in (c). Then it is obvious 
that q € CL· (Α) φ φ. 0^ (A) = ¿, because pAq > -» = (А) for each 
ρ £ S and each q £ S . Thus (2) is proved. || 
З·
1
* In theorem II.3.3 we presupposed that A is upper bounded. This is 
not a superfluous assumption, as we can see from the 2x<»-matrix game 
introduced in 11.1,2: for this game we have inf a. . = -<» for each 
jera 1 , J 
i £ { 1 , 2 } . But i t i s easy to see t h a t v(A) = 0 / - » , (1,1) £ 0 (A), 
Ц + Ц £ O J J U ) / φ. 
3.5 In 1.2.6 we have seen that for each finite matrix game both players 
have optimal mixed strategies. We shall now give an example of a 
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bounded Ix^-matrix game A for which 0 (A) = ¿ . Take 
A := [1 2~1 3"1 T 1 . . . ] . Then v(A) = 0, O^k) = {e^}, O^k) = φ. 
3.6 In what follows we shall repeatedly use the following lemma. [For 
a proof, see [Ц] p.Uö.] 
LEMMA 
Let m € IN. Let v..,v_,... be an infinite sequence of elements in 
IR . Let q € S be such that Σ q.v. is an element of ІЕт. Then 
с j=1 J J 
there is a q € S such that 
00 OB 
E q.v. = Σ q.v. € ch{v,v ,...}. 
3.7 THEOREM 
Let A € M
 Xa¡ (me IN) and suppose that v(A) £ IR. 
If A is one-sided bounded, then 
o^U) # 4 iff o^U) Φ φ. 
Proof: (a) It is obvious that olìU) φ φ implies с£ (A) / Φ [See 
II.3.2.] 
(b) Suppose that A is lower bounded and that q € 0 (A). 
Let a := (Aq ) . Then a € IE . Applying lemma 11.3.6, with 
(Ae1 ) ,(Ae„) ,... in the roles of v.. ,v ,... we can conclude: there 
.*. с is a q € S such that 
Aq = Aq = a < v(A)1 . 
— m 
Hence q £ O ^ U ) ; O ^ U ) Φ φ implies O^ÍA) φ φ. 
(с) Suppose that A is upper bounded and suppose that q € 0 (A). 
Let с := sup {a. . ; i € IN , j € IN}. W.l.o.g. we suppose that 
ι, J m 
с >_ 0 (see 1.1 .15). 
We c o n s t r u c t an mx«>-matrix В = [b. •] .
 H . , as fol lows. 
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Take an i € ΓΝ . 
ш 
(i) if e.Aq e IR, then Ъ. . := а. . for each л e IN. i i,j i,J 
(ii) if e.Aq. = -о», then we determine an n(i) € ITJ such that 
n(i) 
E a. .q. < v(A)-c 
and we define 
f a . . if j <_ n(i) 
Ъ. . := { :¡-':3 
1
'
J
 |a. . ν 0 if j > n(i). 
1
 »J 
Then it is clear that В >_ A and that В is upper hounded. Furthermore 
e.Bq 6 (-οο,ν(Α)] for each i € Ш : of course this is true for 
i £ ΓΝ with e.Aq € IR: if e.Aq* = -=°, then 
m ι ' ι 
с» n(Ì) «о oo 
Σ Ъ. .q. = Σ a. q. + Σ Ъ. .q. < (V(A)-C)+C Σ q. < v(A) 
j=1 1»J J j=1 i.J J j=n(i)+1 1' J J j-n(i)+1 J 
and ζ. \ 
o» n^i) 
Σ Ъ. .•· > Σ a. .q. e IR. 
Applying lemma II.3.6, with (Be ) ,(Be2) ,... in the roles of 
~ с >.t t 
ν.,ν ,... we get: there is a q € S with Bq = Bq . 
Then Aq <_ Bq j< v(A)l . So q £ 0TT(A), and the theorem is proved. | | 
3.8 DEFINITION 
Let A € M (m e IN). Then 
mxoo 
:(A) :- ' 
» if v(A ) > v(A) for each η £ IN 
η 
min {η e IN; v(A ) = v(A)} otherwise 
is called the critical пшпЪег of the matrix кате A (for player II). 
3.9 THEOREM 
Let A 6 Мд^ (me IN). Then 
c(A) < » iff O J J U ) 5* (¿. 
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Proof: (a) Suppose that с(A) < ». Let η € IN Ъе such that 
v(A
n
) = v(A). Take a q. e 0 (A ) and let 
I := (Ч^г q^.O.O,...) € SC. Then 
.Aq = e.A q < v(A ) = v(A) for each i e IN e -
ι 
This implies that | 6 0ιτ^ Α^ ^ ^' 
(h) Suppose that c(A) = ». Let q € S . Take an η 6 IN such that 
q. = 0 for each j > n. Then 
о 
sup pAq = sup pA (q ,q ,.. . ,g ) > v(A ) > v(A) 
p€S pes 
implies that q Í O ^ C A ) . SO 0^ (A) = φ. \ \ 
3.10 From II.3.Τ and II.3.9 we infer 
THEOREM 
Let А Ъе a one-sided hounded mx»-matrix (m e IN) with 0TT(A) Φ 
and v(A) e IR. Then c(A) < ». 
3.11 THEOREM 
Let A £ M such that с(A) < «. Then 
mx» 
0 (A) = η О (A ), θ!: (A) = U а.(О
т
Лк)). 
Ti>c.{k) n>c(A) 
[See t h e NOTATIONS f o r t h e d e f i n i t i o n of a : I R n - » - I 1 . ] 
P r o o f : ( a ) Take a ρ e ОЛА) and an η >_ c ( A ) . Then 
min pAe. _> i n f pAe. >_ v(A) = v(A ) . 
jera J jera J n 
So ρ e 0 T ( A ) . Hence 0 T ( A ) c= П OAk ). I n I , > I η 
n>c(A) 
Let ρ e О-ДА ) for each η > C(A). Let j 6 IN. i n — 
Take an ñ e IN with ñ >_ c(A) ν j . Then 
pAe. = pA-e. > v(A_) = v(A). 
J η j - η 
Hence inf pAe^ > v(A); ρ e 0 (A). So П 0T(A ) с 0T(A). 
jeiN J I n>c(A) I n I 
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(Ъ) Let q 6 0 (A). We take an η >_ c(A) such that q. = 0 for each 
-L-L J 
j > n. Then 
B
n
(q) :- (q^qg,...,^) С S n; e iA n S n(q)
t
 = e.Aq* < v(A) = v(A
n
) 
for each i € ΓΝ„, which implies that s (q) € 0TT(A ): 
ш»
 r
 η II η 
q = a (s (q)) € a (0TT(A )). So we have proved: n n η II η ^ 
θ"
τ
(Α) с U a
n
(0TT(A )). II / ч η II η 
n>c(A) 
Conversely: take a q £ U a (0 (A )). Let n
n
 € IN such that / - \ η 11 η и 
n>c(Aj 
η > c(A) and q £ a (0 (A )). Then s (q) Ê 0TT(A ), and 0 n0 II n0 n0 II n0 
e.Aq = e.A s (q) < v(A ) = v(A) for each i £ IN . 
ι ι n 0 n 0 - n 0 m 
Hence q £ 0TT(A). SO we have also proved that 
U a (OÍA )) c(£T(A). || 
n>c(A) n I I n II 
3.12 Let V1,V ,... Ъе an infinite sequence of subsets of IE™ (me IM). 
Let for each η € IH and χ £ ΙΕ™: 
d(x,V
n
) := inf {Цх-уЦ^ у £ V
n
}. 
Then the set of points χ £ IR , such that the sequence 
d(x,V1))d(x,V2),... 
in IB has 0 as a limit point, is called (cf [3] p.125) the upper 
limit of the sequence ν.,Υρ,... and this set is denoted by lim V . 
THEOREM 
Let A £ M (m £ IN). Then Tim 0T(A ) с 0T(A). mx» I n I 
Proof: If v(A) = --, then we have 0 (A) = 3 Ш => lim 0 (A ). 
Let V(A) £ IR and let ρ £ lim 0 (A ). Then there is a subsequence 
n( 1),n(2),... of 1,2,... and there are ρ /, ч £ О (A , ») for each 
к £ IM such that 
37 
lim l|p-P
n(k)|| - Ііш d(p,0 (A ( j)) = 0 . 
le-*«. k-x» 
Then in a similar way as in (d) of the proof of II.2.2 we can con­
clude that ρ € 0I(A). Hence îïm 0I(An) <= O^-ÍA). | | 
3.13 The following example shows that 0T(A) can be unequal to lim 0 (A ). 
EXAMPLE 
Let Γ,
 2-1 3-1 u-1 
0 0 о 0 
Then v(A) = 0, ОІДА) = i, 0T(A ) = {еЛ for each η € IN and 1 1 i n i 
0T(A) = S2 # ( е Л = î ïm 0T(A ) . 
ι ι i n 
З.І
1
» From II.3.12 and II.3.11 we infer 
THEOREM 
Let A £ M (me IN) with c(A) < ». Then 0T(A) = Tim 0T(A ). m*» l i n 
3.15 THEOREM 
Let A € M (m € IN). 
mx00 
(1) If A is lower bounded, then O ^ U ) c= с1(0° (A)). 
(2) If A is bounded, then O ^ U ) = cliO^U)). 
Proof: (a) Suppose that A is lower bounded. Let q € 0 (A). 
We shall have given the proof of (1) if we can show that for each 
.c 
ε > 0 there is a q € О-г-ДА) such that | | q-q | | < ε. 
•о 
Let e > 0. Take an N € IN such that t := Σ q. < ìe.If t = O.let 
j=N+1 J 
q := q and we have ||q-q |L = 0 < ε. Suppose that t > 0. Let 
m 
a := Σ q.Ae* < (А)і . Then a € (IR111)*. Put v. := Ae* . for each j = 1 J J - m J N+j 
j € IN and r :- ( t " 1 ^ . t ' 1 ^ , . ..) e S. Then 
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œ Ν 
Г r.v. = t"1(a- Σ q.Ae^) € (1Вт)г. 
j-1 J J j-1 J J 
By applying lemma II.3.6 (with г in the role of q) we get: 
t - V . E
 q.Ae*)€chiAeJ+1,Ae;+2,...}. 
с -1 N t 
Let (s-, . ,s ,... ) e S Ъе such that t" (a - Ζ q.Ae.) = 
ll I 14 £1 I _ 1 U J 
=
 .
=
5
+ 1
 SJ A el· L e t S := {<ll'(l2'--"4>tsWtsii+2'-'-
)
·
 T h e n 
q C S , I I a -qlL < ε and 
e^ ' ε ' ' 1 
N » 
Aq1 = Σ q.Ae^ + Σ ts.Ae* = a < (А)1 . 
Hence q e О І Д А ) . 
ε 11 
(b) Suppose that A is hovmded. 
Let q ,q ,... be a sequence in 0TT(A) converging to some q €. 1 . 
Then q € Ξ. For each i € IH , 
m 
χ ι-»- е.Αχ (χ € S) 
к is a continuous function on S and e.A(q ) <_ v(A). Thus, we may 
t f 
conclude that e.Aq < v(A) for each i e IW . So q € 0_T(A). Hence 
ι — m * II 
clíOjjU)) с O^ÍA). Combining this with ( 1 ) we get (2). || 
3.16 EXAMPLE 
Г
 0 0 0 0 0 
1 _2 -3 -1» -5 
Let A:= 
Then v(A) = 0. For each η £ TS\{1} 
q11 := ( η + ΐ ) " 1 η
β ι
 + (η+1)" 1 β
η
 € O ^ U ) ; l im q11 = e1 І O ^ U ) . 
n-x» 
Hence О-Г-ЛА) Φ clíO-.ÍA)) for this upper bounded matrix A. 
3.17 THEOREM 
Let A e M (meiN). Then 
mx=> 
(l) 0T(A) is a compact convex subset of ST. 
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(2) 0^ T(A) and O T T(A) are convex subsets of S. 
f 1 
(3) If A is a bounded matrix, then 0 (A) is a closed subset of 1 
ΙΓ 
Proof: (1) 0 (A) = S m η Π ÍP € IR™; pAe. > v(A)}; so 0 (A) is 
j = 1 J 
-,ηι the intersection of the compact convex set S and (infinitely many) 
convex closed hyper-halfspaces in IE if v(A) £ IB, and 0 (A) = S 
if v(A) = -=>. Hence 0 (A) is a compact convex subset of S . 
(2) 0 T T(A) is convex, because it is the intersection of the convex 
A 1 
set S and m convex subsets of 1 of the form 
{q £ I1 ; e J ^ < v(A)} (i e П^) 
But then 0 I I ( A ) (= 0 I I ( A ) n ^ i s a l s o convex. 
(3) is a direct consequence of theorem 11.3.15(2). || 
3.18 REMARKS 
(a) Let A be the bounded 2x'»-matrix 
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 .. 
-1 1 1 1 .. 
Then v(A) = 0, O J J U ) = {q € sSq^i}; O^ÍA) = {q e S^^J}. 
0 T T(A) is not closed. 
(b) Let A be a bounded mx=-matrix (m € IH). In II.3.17 we proved 
that 0TT(A) is a closed subset of S (with respect to the ]|.||.-
norm). 
We shall now prove that 0T (A) is also a closed subset of S if 
S is provided with the topology of coordinatewise convergence. 
[This was pointed out to me by F. DELBAEN.] 
Let y € S and let y(1),y(2),... be a sequence in 0T (A) such 
that 
lim y(k). = y. for each j e ΓΝ. 
к-н»
 J
 '
] 
Then it is not difficult to show (see [k6]) that 
CO 
lim Г |y(k).-y.| = 0. 
k-x» j = i J J 
But then it follows from 11.3.17(3) that y € o£ (A). 
Because S, with the topology of coordinatewise convergence, is 
metrisatile we have proved the assertion. | | 
3.19 THEOREM 
Let A € M (m ε IM) and suppose that c(A) < ». 
m*
00 
Then 0 T T(A) is the convex hull of a finite or a countably infinite 
subset of 1 ; moreover 
ext(0°T(A)) = U a (ext(0TT(A ))), 0^T(A) = ch(ext(0^T(A))). II _ f.\ η II η II II 
П>С(А; 
Proof : (a) For each η _> С ( А ) : О (A ) is a polytope (see 1.2.8); 
hence 0 X T(A ) = ch(ext 0 T T(A )), and ext(0TT(A )) is a finite set. 
11 η II η II η 
Then a (ext(0TT(A ))) is also finite; and U a (ext(0TT(A ))) 
η II η , ν η II η 
η>c(Α) 
is a finite or a countably infinite set. 
(b) We shall now prove that a (ext(0TT(A ))) e ext(0TT(A)) for each 
η >. c(A) . Take an η >_ c(A) . 
Let χ € a (ext(0 (A ))). Suppose that χ ,x € 0TT(A) are such that 
1 2 1 2 
χ = ¿(x +x )· Then (x ), = (x ). = 0 for each к > η (because 
x k = ο, ( χ \ ι о, (x
2) k > o, xk = J(x
1)k^(x
2)k). 
Hence s (χ) = ¿(s (x1)+s (χ 2)),
 Ξτι
(χ1),3 (x2) e 0 T T(A ). 
η η η η η II η 
Because s (χ) € ext(0TT(A )), we get s (χ ) = s (χ ), and then also 
1 Ο η 
χ = χ . Consequently, χ 6 ext(0TT(A)), and we have proved that 
U a(ext(0 T T(A n))) с ext(0=T(A)). 
n>c(A) I I n I I 
(c) Take a q. e ext(0^ (A)). Let η >^  c(A) be such that q. = 0 for 
1*1 
each j > η . Then s (q) £ 0T T(A ) and i t i s easy t o see t h a t then 
s (q) € ex t (0 ( A n ) ) . Hence 
q = a n ( s n ( q ) ) € a ^ e x t f O ^ U ^ ) ) с U a ^ e x t i O ^ U J ) ) . 
n>c(A) 
So we have also proved that ext (0TT(A)) cz U a (ext(0TT(A ))). J.1 ι .\ TÍ II η 
n>c(A) 
(d) chtextiO^U))) с О ^ Ц ) Ъесаизе О ^ Ц ) is convex. 
Let q £ 0 T T ( A ) . Then in a similar manner as in (c) we can prove 
that s (q) € 0TT(A ) for some η > c(A). 
η ^ II η — 
So q E a
 n
(0TT(A )) = ari(ch(ext(0TT(A )))) = ch(aTi(ext(0TT(ATi) ) ) ) с 
η il η η il η η II η 
cchíextíO^U))). || 
3.20 THEOREM 
Let A e M (meiïï) and suppose that v(A) e IH\{0}. Let 
m*00 
q € 0 T T ( A ) . Then the following assertions are equivalent. 
(1) q e exttO^U)) 
(2) there is a finite non-singular square submatrix К of A such 
that 
(*) V(A) = (і
к
к"
1
і£г1, qj = V(A)K-1I£. 
[For an explanation of the notations, we refer the reader to 
1.2.8.] 
Proof: (a) Suppose that q E ext(0^ (A)). Let η >_ c(A) be such that 
q. = 0 for each j > n. Then s (q) € ext(0 (A )). Take a 
ρ € ext(0T(A )).From Shapley-Snow's theorem (see Ι.2.Θ) we can 
derive that there is a finite square submatrix К of (A and there­
fore also of) A such that 
(i) q£ = (1K adj(K)lJ)-1 adj(K)lJ, 
(ii) v(A) = det(K)(lK adj(K)lJ)"1 
1*2 
(and ρ
κ
 = (1K adj(K)l^)"11K adj(K)). 
Because v(A) / 0, it follows from (ii) that К is non-singular. 
Then adj(K) = det(K)K~ , (i) and (ii) imply (*). Hence we have 
proved that (1) implies (2). 
I P ρ 
(Ъ) Suppose that (2) holds. Let q. ,q, € 0TT(A) such that 
i p ι ρ 
q = ¿(q +q ). Then (q ). = (q ). = q. = 0 for each j which corres-
ponds with a column of A which does not play a role in К (q is a 
IV 
probahility vector). From the non-singularity of К and 
Kq* = ν(Α)ΐ£, K U V < v(A)l*, К(а2) < v(A)lJ 
1 2 
we can conclude that q . = ( q ) . = ( q ) . for each j which corres-
J J J 
ponds with a column of K. Hence q = q , q e ext(0TT(A)), and we 
have proved that (2) implies (1). || 
3.21 REMARKS 
(1) Theorem II.3.20 associates with extreme points of 0
 T(A) of an 
mx^-matrix game A certain non-singular square submatrices of A. 
Each extreme point is associated with at least one square sub-
matrix, but it is easy to see that with a non-singular square 
submatrix К of A there corresponds at most one extreme point. 
Because there are only a countably infinite number of square 
submatrices of A we can again conclude (see also II.3.19) that 
ext(0TT(A)) is a finite or a countably infinite set. 
(2) If we drop the assumption in theorem II.3.20 that v(A) φ 0, 
then we can prove (with the same techniques as in [1*7] р.З^) 
that (1) of II.3.20 is equivalent with: 
(2') there exists a square submatrix К of A such that 
1 K adj (K)1* / 0 and 
1*3 
q£ = (1K adj(K)lJ)"1adj(K)l*, v(A) = det(K)(1Kadj(K)lJ)-1, 
3.22 We leave it to the reader to prove the following corollary of 
II.3.20 and 11.3.21(2). [Cf [23].] 
COROLLARY 
Let Α ε M (m € Hf) such that 0^T(A) φ φ. Then there is a 
tl € 0 T T(A) such that q. φ 0 for at most m elements j € IM. 
-LI J 
3.23 THEOREM 
Let m € IH. Let A € M such that v(A) € IR. 
mx"» 
Then exttOjjU)) = extiO^U)). 
Proof: (a) We shall first prove that extiO^U)) с O ^ U ) . 
Take a q e θ!Ϊ (A), q Í SC. Take an η e IN, η > m. Then we can find 
η positive coordinates of q. For convenience of notation we suppose 
w.l.o.g. that q1 φ 0, q2 φ 0,...^ φ 0. 
We can find an χ e IR \{0} such t h a t 
t n 
A x = 0 and Ε χ . = 0. 
j-1 J -
Let χ := (χ-,χ.,.,.,χ ,0,0,...). Take ε > 0 such that q+εχ € S and 
q-εχ e Sr. Then 
e.A(q+8x) = e.Aq <_ v(A), e.A(q-8x) <^  v(A) 
for each i £ IN . Hence q+εχ, q-εχ € 0__(A). Because 
m il 
q = ä((q+ex) + (q^x) ), we have q Í ext О - Л А ) . NOW we have proved 
that exttolLU) с SC. Thus ex.t{0T (А) с O ^ U ) . 
(b) Because OjjiA) <= 0^ (A), it follows from (a) that 
exttO^-U)) = extlO^CA)) П O ^ U ) с exttO^ÍA)). 
(c) We shall now prove that ext(0j (А)) С extíO^U)). 
Take a q € ext(0TT(A)). Suppose that q = ¿(q +q ) for some 
q1,q2 e Oj (A). Then q1 ,q2 € SC, and therefore q1 ,q2 € O ^ U ) . So 
q1 = q2; q e extíO^A)). || 
3.2І* THEOREM 
Let A £ M (me IN) such that V(A) = -». 
Then ext(Oj (A)) = φ. 
Proof: Take a q € 0^ (A). Since q g SC, there exist k,l £ IN, к φ 1 
such t h a t q φ 0, q φ 0. Let ε := min {q k ,q } > 0. 
1 2 
Then q = H q +q ) , where 
Ί r ? r 
q := q + e e k - e e 1 e О-^Ц) and q := ς -εβ ] ι +εβ 1 С O^k). 
So q І e x t ( 0 j (A)) . Hence e x t ( 0 j (A)) = (й. | | 
§1*. E q u a l i z e r s a n d e s s e n t i a l p u r e 
s t r a t e g i e s 
1+.1 DEFINITIONS 
Let A € M (m e IN). Then the elements of 
mx» 
E (A) := {i 6 IN ; t he r e i s a ρ e 0 (A) such t h a t p . > 0} , 
E I I (A) := {j £ IN; t h e r e i s a q € 0 ° ( А ) such t h a t q. > 0}, 
E J J U ) := {j € IN; t h e r e i s a q Ç. O ^ U ) such t h a t q. > 0} 
are ca l l ed e s s e n t i a l pure s t r a t e g i e s of player I , e s s e n t i a l and 
r - e s s e n t i a l pure s t r a t e g i e s of player I I r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
The elements of 
GI(A) := {i e INm; eJlq* = v(A) for each q £ 0° (A)}, 
0TAk) := {i e IN ; e.Aq* = v(A) for each q £ c£T(A)}, l m ι 11 
GJJCA) := {j 6 IN; pAe* = v(A) for each ρ € O^k)} 
1*5 
axe called equalizers and r-equalizers of player I, equalizers of 
player II respectively. 
4.2 Let A £ M (m £ Πί). The following remarks, whose proofs are left 
to the reader,can Ъе made. 
(a) EjU) Φ Φ, EII(A) с EJJÍA), G^A) Э G£(A). 
(b) If v(A) = -», then ET(A) = GT(A) = G^A) = IN and 
I I I m 
EII(A) = GjjiA) = φ. 
(c) If V(A) = -«· and A is upper bounded, then ETT(A) = Ш. [see 
11.3.3(2).] 
(d) If v(A) € IR and A is one-sided bounded, then E (A) = E (A), 
G (A) = Gj(A). [Modify the proof of 11.3.7·] 
1+.3 In solving matrix games, the following theorem is often useful. 
THEOREM 
Let A £ M (m £ IH). Then ET(A) с GT(A) and ETT(A) с G T T(A). mx» I l 11 II 
Proof: If OÍ: (A) = φ, then й^к) = IN :з E (A). Suppose that 
Oj (A) φ φ. Let i 6 EjU). Take β ρ ε OjÍA) such that pi > 0 and 
let q e 0^T(A). Then e.Aq < v(A) for each i ε IH . Since 
^ II ι ^  — m 
v(A) = pAq* = ρ (e. Aq 1)* Σ p.fe.Aq1) < ρ (e. Aqt)+(l-p. )v(A), 
1
o о іега\{і
л
} 1 1 o 1 o 1 o 
t m t 
we may conclude that e. Aq >_ v(A) . Thus e. Aq = v(A) for each 
10 1o 
q ε O^ÍA); i0 ε GjU). 
Therefore we have proved that ET(A) с G-ÍA). 
The second inclusion in the theorem can he proved in a similar 
manner. || 
!+.U Note that for an upper bounded mx^-matrix game A with v(A) = -«·: 
1*6 
EjjU) = IN φ φ = GjjU). 
One can prove the following theorem in a similar way as we have 
proved theorem II.1+.3. 
THEOREM 
Let A £ M (me IH) and suppose that v(A) € IE. Then 
mXo0 
EjU) с Gj(A) and E ^ U ) с GJJÍA). 
U.5 It is obvious what we mean Ъу ET(A), E T I(A), G (A) and G (A) for a 
finite matrix game A. It is well-known (see e.g. theorem 3.1.1 in 
[25]) that for such a game we have: EjU) = G^A) and E ^ U ) = G-rjU) 
The following example shows that for semi-infinite matrix games ET(A) 
can Ъе unequal to G T(A) and ETT(A) to G (A). 
EXAMPLE 
Let A be the Sx^-matrix 
-1 0 -2 -2 -2 
-1 
-1 -1 -1+ -5 
Since 
-2 2-1 S"1 IT1 
(i,i,0)A = (-1,-1,-J,-|.-J,...) > -1
ш
 and Ae^ = -1*. 
we may conclude that 
v(A) = -1, (i.l.O) £ OjÍA), e1 € O ^ U ) , GII(A) с {1,2}, 
EjU) => {1,2} and EII(A) з {1}. 
For each (ρ-,ίΡρίΡ^ ) € S with p. > 0 we have ρ £ 0 (A) because 
t 
pAe. < -1 for large j e IN. 
Thus EI(A) = {1,2}. Take a (p^Pg.O) € S3 with (p1 ,p2,0) # (5,5,0). 
Then (p^Pg.O) ? 0I(A). [For if p1 < 5, then pAe^ < -1 ; and if 
p1 > 5, then pAe* < -1 for large j € IN.] Hence 0 (A) = {(5,5,0)} 
1*7 
and Ο
 τ
(Α) = {1,2}. Let q. € О^ (A). Because G (A) = {1,2}, ve have 
in view of ІіЛ.З: q. = 0 for each j ¿. 3· Since e.Aq > -1 if 
q2 / 0, we get 
0°T(A) = {еЛ, GT(A) = {1,2,3} and E T T(A) = {1}. II 
Conclusion: 
I I 
ί
ιτ
{Α) = {1,2} ?ί {1} = E I I ( A ) , GjfA) = {1,2,3} Φ {1,2} = E^A) , 
k.6 THEOREM 
Let A £ M (m £ IN) such that C(A) e IH. Then 
ET(A) с Π ΕΤ(Α J , ΕΤΤ(Α) = U KM), 1 / > Ι η il . /.ν 11 η 
n^cCA) n>_c(A) 
G (A) = Π GT(An), GTT(A) з U G (A ). I , » Ι η II , > II η 
n>c(A) n>_c(A) 
Proof: The theorem is a consequence of II.3.11. || 
U.7 REMARKS 
(a) Let A be the hounded 2x,»-matrix 
0 - 1 - 1 -1 
0 1 2-1 S"1 ... 
Then one can show that 
(1) v(A) = 0, OjU) = {e2}, O^fA) = {e^, 
(2) v(A ) = 0, 0XT(A ) = {еЛ for each η e IH and 
η il η ι 
0I(An) = chUO.lMirW-l))} 
Hence 
c(A)=1, GTT(A) = U GTT(A) = {1}, ET(A) = {2}# {1,2} = П ET(A ) 
Ι
1
 /τ-π,τ II η 1 -.,-,, 1 η 
(ъ) For the matrix A, considered in II.h.5, we have 
U G (A) = {1} / G T T(A). 
ne IN 
U8 
l+.θ THEOREM 
Let A € M (m € IN). If v(A) = -» or if c(A) < » and ІИ\Е
ТТ
(А) 
mx» II 
is a finite set, then 
E (A) = G (A) and 0 (A) is a polytope. 
Proof: (a) Suppose that v(A) = -™. Then 0T(A) = S , a polytope; and 
ET(A) = GT(A) = IN . 
(ъ) Let c(A) € IN. Then v(A) £ IR. We suppose w.l.o.g. that v(A) = 0 
(see 1.1.16). Suppose further that IH\E (A) is a finite set. 
Take а к € IN such that к >_ c(A) and such that j ξ. E
 T(A) for each 
j > k. 
I n v iew of I I . U . 3 : OjÍA) = О^А^) П П V
n
 where 
n>k 
V := {χ £ I R m ; хАе^ = 0 f o r e a c h j £ I N N IN, } (n > k ) . 
η J П К 
S i n c e V , . c: V f o r e a c h η > к , we h a v e dini( Π V ) = l i m dim(V ) . 
n+1 η η η 
n>k η*" 
Take an η £ IN such that η > к and such that dim( Π V ) = dim(V—). 
. η η 
n>k 
Then 
Π V = V_, 0 (A) = 0 T ( A ) Π V_ = 0 (A-) and E (A) = E T ( A _ ) . ^ . n n i í k n i n 1 I n 
n>k 
Now we know from I.2.θ that 0T(A) (= 0T(A—)) is a polytope. 
In II.U.5 we noted that ET(A_) = GT(A-). 
I n I n 
Hence ET(A) = ET(A_) = GT(A_) з G X(A) (see II.h.6). 
ι i n i n I 
In view of ІіЛ.З, we may conclude that E T(A) = G (A) . || 
U.9 THEOREM 
Let m £ IN. Let A £ M such that E _(A) is a finite non-empty set. 
Then 0 (A) is a polytope in 1 . 
Proof: Take an η £ IN such that j £ Εττ^ Α^ f o r e a c h J > n· TheTi 
QjAA) = a
n
(0TT(An)) = an(ch(ext(0TT(A )))) = ch(aTi(ext(0TT(An) ) ) ), 11 η 11 η η II η η II η » 
1*9 
and a (ext(C> (A ))) is a finite set in view of 1.2.8. Hence 0TT(A) 
η II η II 
is a polytope in 1 . | | 
U.IO Let meiM. Let x,y € IRm(lH ). We say that χ dominates y, and 
that y is, dominated Ъу χ [notation x >. у] , if x. >. у. for each 
i e ra (ie ra). 
m 
If χ· > y· for each i € IN (ie IM), then we say that χ dominates 
y strictly and we denote this Ъу χ » у. 
Ц.11 THEOREM 
Let A e м ( m e r a ) . 
mx» 
(1) Let r,s e IH such that Ае » Ae1. Then r ? E jU). 
(2) Let r,s e IN such that e A >> e A and suppose that 0TT(A) / ¿. 
m r s 11 
Then s f£ E (A). 
Proof : (1) Take a p e 0 (Α) (ΐ4 φ by II.2.2). АеЬ » Ae implies 
pAe > pAe _> v(A). 
Thus r g G T T ( A ) a n d ^en, in view of II.lt.3, r ί E (A). 
(2) can be proved in a similar way. || 
U.12 We note that for the 2x»-matrix game in II.3.13, with empty 0 (A), 
we have 
e-A » e A and 2 € E (A). 
U.13 With the aid of the following theorem one can often reduce the 
problem of solving a matrix game to the problem of solving a rela-
ted matrix game of smaller size. 
THEOREM 
Let A € V^xa¡ (m e IN\{1}). 
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(i) Suppose that there exists a (q_ j4o>ch >... ) € Ξ such that 
Σ q..Ae. converges in (IE U {-<«}) and such that 
j=2 J 3IB 
Ae. » Σ q.Ae.. Let В € M Ъе the matrix with columns 1 .
 2
uj j mx» 
Ae ,Ae ,... Then 
v(A) = v(B), Ο
τ
(Α) = 0I(B); if (x1,x2,...) e 0^(3), 
then (0,x1,x2,...) e O^ÍA). 
If v(A) € IR, then 
O J J U ) = {(o,x1>x2,...) e ι 1; (x1,x2,...) e OJJCB)}. 
(2) Let there Ъе an a € ch{e0A,eQA e A} such that e-A << a . 
¿ i m 1 
Let С be the (m-1)x»-matrix with rows e2A,e.A,... . Then 
v(c) = v(A), OjjtA) = 0^(0); (p1 ,p2,... , ρ ^ ) e O^C) 
implies (O.p,,p0,...,p J € 0T(A). If, furthermore, v(A) £ IE, 
ι £L m— ι ι 
then 
OjU) = {(o,pl,p2,...,pm_1) e iEm; (P 1,P 2 P ^ ^ e OjíC)}. 
Proof: We shall only prove (l), leaving the proof of (2) to the 
reader. 
(a) Let с € IR and с > v(A). Take а у £ S such that e.Ay <_ с for 
each i ε IN . 
m 
Let y := (д2У1+У2,а3У1+У3,д1+У1+Уці..·). Then y is an r-mixed 
strategy of player II in the matrix game В such that 
OD 00 
By* = Σ (а-Уі+У-ке^ ^ Σ y.Ae. < cl . j
= 2 J J J j = 1 J J 
Hence v(B) <_ с for each с > V(A) . Furthermore, for each ρ e 0 T(A) 
we have 
v(B) >_ inf pBe. >_ inf pAe. = v(A). 
jeiN J jera J 
Thus we have proved that v(A) = (в) and that О (А) с О (В), 
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(Ъ) Take a p e О (В). Then 
рАе. = рВе. >_ (В) = (А) for each j >_ 2 
pAe^ > p( Σ q.Aeb > Σ <і, (А) = v(A) j
= 2 J J j = 2 J 
Hence ρ € O^A) ; 0 I(A) = 0
І
( в ) . 
(c) Let χ = ( x 1 , x 2 , . . . ) E O J J C B ) . Then 
e . A Í O . x , , x „ , . . . ) = e.Bx < v(B) = V(A) for each i e ΓΗ . 
i l e i — m 
Thus ( 0 , x 1 , x 2 , . . . ) € O J J U ) . 
(d) Suppose that v(A) € IR. 
It follows from (ъ) that 1 t G (A). 
But then 1 Í E*T(A), in view of II.U.U. Hence 
OjI(A) = {(0>x1,x2l...) € I1; (x1,x2,...) e 0^(8)}. || 
§5. C o n s t r u c t i o n o f s e m i - i n f i n i t e 
m a t r i x g a m e s w i t h p r e s c r i b e d o p t i m a l 
s t r a t e g y s p a c e s 
5.1 Bohnenblust, Karlin and Shapley [5] and Gale and Sherman [17] 
constructed finite matrix games with prescribed values and optimal 
strategy spaces. 
In this section we shall construct semi-infinite matrix games with 
a prescribed value, a prescribed optimal strategy space of player 
I and a prescribed c-optimal strategy space of player II. It appears 
that each non-empty compact convex subset of S (m £ IN) is an 
optimal strategy space of player I for some m>«»-matrix game. [For 
finite matrix games only polytopes with certain properties can be 
optimal strategy spaces (see the principal theorem in [IT] p. 1*2).] 
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с . . . . . . 
Moreover, those subsets Y of S for which there is a semi-infmite 
matrix game A with 0 (A) = Y are characterized. 
5.2 REMARKS 
Let m e IH, С с S™, Y с 5° and ν e IR. 
(i) Note that there is an mx<=-matrix game A with v(A) = -», 0T(A) = С 
and Oj (A) = Y if and only if С = S m and Y = jj. 
(2) Note that there is an mx^-matrix game A with v(A) = v, 0T(A) = С 
and 0 (A) = Y iff there is an mx^-matrix game В with v(B) = 0, 
0 (В) = С and 0° (В) = Y. [See І.І.іб.] 
5.3 I suppose that the following lemma is well-known. It is easy to prove 
with the aid of the supporting hyperplane theorem, bearing in mind 
that IR \C is a Lindelof space. 
LEMMA 
Let m £ IS. Let С Ъе a non-empty compact convex subset of S . 
Then there exists a sequence п-.Пр,... of vectors in IR \{0} such 
that 
00 
С = Sm Π Π [η.]"'' 
j = 1 J where [n.] + := {x e IRm; xn* > 0}. 
J J 
5.U THEOREM 
Let С be a non-empty compact convex subset of £5 (m € Hi). 
Then there exists an A € M such that v(A) = 0, 0_(А) = С and 
mx
00
 X 
o^U) = 4. 
Proof: Take n. ,n , . . . in IRm\{0} such t h a t 
OO 
С = Sm Π Π [ n . ] + [See I I . 5 . 3 . ] 
j - 1 J 
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Let А Ъе the matrix with columns 
1 ,η.+Ι ,2 1 ,n +2 1 ,n„+2 1 ,3 1 ,n +3 1 ,n+3 1 ,n-+3 1 , 
m' I m ' m' 1 m' 2 m m' 1 m 2 m' 3 m' 
h~ 1 ,... respectively. 
m 
We shall prove that A has the desired properties. Since k" 1 is 
(for each к € IN) a column of A and e.(k 1 ) = k~ for each i С IW , 
i m m 
we may conclude that v(A) < inf k" = 0 . 
From 
and 
kera 
1 t p(k" 1 ) > 0 for each к £ TN and each ρ £ С 
m 
pUj+k" 1!^ > 0+k"1 > 0 for all j € IN, к e íj.j+l,...} 
J 
and ρ £ С 
it follows that 
(1) v(A) >_ 0, and hence v(A) = 0, 
(2) С с 0
τ
(Α), 
(3) GII(A) = si and thus 0^ (A) = «i (see ІІ.Ц.З). 
Now let χ £ Sm\C. Then we can find a j € IN and а к € íj,j+1,...} 
such that x(n.+k~ 1 ) < 0. This implies that χ $ 0T(A). So we have 0 m 1 
proved that 0 (A) = C, 0° (A) = φ and v(A) = 0. || 
5.5 In the proof of the following theorem we use ideas from [IT] and [5]. 
[See also [25] theorem 3.1*.!.] 
THEOREM 
с 
Let Ρ be a polytope in S . Let С be a non-empty compact convex sub-
set of S (к e IH). Then there exist an m € {k,k+1,...} and an 
A £ М ^ such that 
v(A) = 0, 0T(A) = a. (C) and 0^T(A) = P. I k,m II 
[See the NOTATIONS for the definition of a, : IHk -»• IRm.] 
k,m 
J!* 
Proof: Let E(P) := {j € IM; q. φ 0 for some q. 6 Ρ}, 
E(C) := {i € IM ; p. φ 0 for some ρ e С}. 
Then Е(Р) and Е(С) are finite sets. W.l.o.g. we suppose that 
E(C) = IN (p <. k) and E(P) = IN (q € IN). Let C' := s. (С) с IHP, 
ρ q л,р 
Ρ' := s (Ρ) с IB4-. Let f Ъе the питЪег of interior bounding faces 
of P' in S4. [See [17] p.^2 for the definition of interior bounding 
face.] Then there are a..,a2,...,a € IRq\{0} such that 
(1) P» = lh(P') Π S 4 Π Π [a.]" (where [a,Γ := {y e IH4; a.y* <_ 0}) 
i=1 ^ 
and such that 
(2) for each i € IN there is a y € Ρ' with a-y < 0. [IN. := ІЛ 
Let с := (q-dim(lh(Pl)))-(p-dim(lh(C'))). 
If с <_ 0, then let t := p, and take a linear subspace D of IR such 
that C' <=• D and such that 
(3) t-dim(D) = q-dimClhCP')). 
If с > 0, then let t := p+c+1 and let D be the linear subspace 
1 c + 1 t lh(a .(C) U {(c+1) Σ e _,..}) of IH . Then a . (С) с D and also 
Р»
г
 i_ 1 P
+i Pjt 
(3) holds for this D. 
In both cases we can, in view of (3), find a linear map Τ : IR -> IR4-
such that 
(¡t) Ker(T) = D, Im(T) = (Ih(P'))1. 
We now construct an mxq-matrix B, where m := t+f if t+f >^  к and 
m := к if t+f < k, as follows. If t+f >_ k, then we take as rows for 
B: 
Те ,Te2» · · · »Те. ,a ,a.^t... ,в.„. 
If t+f < k, then 
Te1 ,Te2,.. .,Tet,a1 ,a2,. ..,af.,af.,... ,а^ (k+1-t-f times a^) 
are the rows of B. 
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Now we leave it to the reader to show that one cau find a sequence 
η.,η-,... in IE such that 
(5) a . ( C , ) = S t n D n Π [n.] + p,t 
and such that 
P. j., J 
(6) for each j £ IH there is а с £ a ,(C') with en. > 0. 
P>t J 
Let now A £ M Ъе the matrix whose first g columns are the q 
mx=> 
columns of В and with Ae . . := (a,. (n.)) for each j € IN. 
q.+j t,m j 
From (U) and (1) respectively it follows that for each q e P: 
(7) e-Aq = 0 for each i € IH , 
(8) e-Aq < 0 for each i € IH VIH.,.. 
i — m t 
With the aid of (U) and (5) respectively we can derive that for 
each ρ € а^ (С) : 
(9) pAe. = 0 for each j ε IH , 
(10) pAe. > 0 for each j ε ΓΝΜΝ . 
We may conclude from (7), (8), (9) and (10) that 
(11) v(A) = 0, Ρ с O ^ U ) and a^
 m
(C) с O^k). 
It follows from E(C) = IN , E(P) = IN , (11), (2), (6) and II.1+.3 
Ρ 4 
that 
(12) GI(A) = INp and G-^U) = IH . 
We infer from (12), (U) and (11) that 
(5) 
0T(A) = a. „(S* Π D Π Π [n.]
+) = а, (С), I t,m ._ j Tt,m f
 (1) 
0°T(A) = an(lh(P·) Π S*
1
 Π Π [a.]') = Ρ. | | 
4. j
 = 1 J 
5.6 We want to characterize in ΙΙ.5·7 the non-empty subsets Y of (1 ) c 
for which there exists a semi-infinite matrix A such that 0 (A) = Y. 
For that purpose we need some 
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DEFINITIONS 
(1) A linear subspace V of (l ) is called a co-finite subspace if 
1 2 к IN there exist а к £ IN and χ ,x χ € IR such that 
V = {y £ (l1)c; χ1/1 = 0 for each i e TN^i. 
(2) We shall call a non-empty subset Y of S a quasi-polytope if 
there exists a countable subset Τ of (1 ) c such that Y = ch(T) 
and such that a (S ) Γ) Τ is a finite set for each η € IN. 
η 
с 
Let Y be quasi-polytope in S . Let for each η € IN 
Yn := ch(Sn(an(Sn) Π Y)). 
Then Y is α polytope (possibly empty) for each η € IN and 
CO 
Y = U a (Y ) for each ρ ε IB. Let f := 0 if Y = «S and let f 
η η η η η 
η=Ρ _
 η 
be the number of interior bounding faces of Y in S if Υ Φ i 
η η 
(ne in). 
Then f := sup f is called the face-number of Y. 
nein n 
Note that f ξ. IÑ U {0} and that f1 <. f2 <_ f 3 < ... (see [21] p.33, 
theorem 5 and [17] p.'•О, property 6). 
5-7 THEOREM 
с Let Y be a non-empty subset of S . Then the following two assertions 
are equivalent. 
(1) There exist an m € IN and an A £ M such that v(A) = 0 and 
O ^ U ) = Y. 
(2) Y is a quasi-polytope with a finite face-number for which there 
exist a co-finite subspace V of (l1)c such that lh(Y) П Sc = V П Sc 
Proof: (a) Suppose that (1) holds. Then from II.3.19 and 1.2.8 we 
infer that Y is a quasi-polytope. [Take Τ := ext(0^ (A)). Then 
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a (S n ) Π Τ = (¡S i f η < c(A) and a (S n ) П Τ = a (ex t (0 T T (A )) ) i f 
η > c(A).] 
In view of (2) of t h e p r i n c i p a l theorem in [IT] р. '+З, for each 
η >_ c(A) we have f <_ m-E (A ) < m; and f = 0 for each η < c(A). 
Hence t h e face-number f of Y i s f i n i t e . 
Let | G T ( A ) | = k. We suppose w . l . o . g . t h a t G (A) = IM . Then 
к I K 
Ï = SC Π Π {у e ( i V ; е.Ауг = 0} Π П {у £ ( l 1 )С;е.Ау < 0} . 
, і=1 1 і=к+1 
к i f t 
Let V := Π {у e ( l ) ; e.Ay = 0} . Then V i s a c o - f i n i t e l i n e a r 
i=1 1 
subspace of ( l 1 ) c . Y <= V П SC implies t h a t lh(Y) Π S c с V П S C . 
Let ζ С V Π S c . We s h a l l prove t h a t ζ € lh(Y) Π S c . 
This i s t r u e i f к = m. Suppose t h a t к < m. 
For each i e ΓΝ\ΙΝ. take a y 1 € Y such t h a t e-Aíy1)* < 0 and l e t 
m κ i 
-1 m i 
y := (m-k) Σ y e Y. For each t E (0,1) and each i e IN. we 
i=k+1 k 
have e . A ( t y + ( l - t ) z ) = 0. We may take a t 0 € (0 ,1) such t h a t 
e.A(t y+( 1_t.)z) <0 for each i e IN \ΓΝ because e.Ay < 0 for each 1 0 0 ~" m К ι 
i e ni чін.. 
m к 
So tQy+(-\-tQ)z € Y. But then ζ € lh(Y). Hence V П S C = lh(Y) П SC. 
Thus we have proved that (1) implies (2). 
(b) Suppose that (2) holds. Let f and Y
n
 (n £ IN) be as in II.5.6 
(2) and let f be the (finite) face-number of Y. Take an η £ IN such 
that Υ φ <t> and f = f for each η > ñ. 
η η — 
1 2 f IN — 
Then we can find r ,r ,...,r e IR such that for each η >^  n: 
f .
 t 
(*) Y
n
 = lh(Y
n
) Π S n Π Π {q € Sn; sn(r1)<iÏ < 0}. 
i=1 
Let V be a co-finite subspace of (l1)C such that lh(Y) П Sc = V П SC. 
1 2 к 
For some к £ IN there exists a sequence χ ,x ,...,x of elements of 
IN 
IH such that 
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V = {y € (11)C; x1yt = 0 for each i € ΙΗ
χ
}. 
k+1 IH Construct a linear map Τ : IE ->• IR such that 
-1 k + 1 1 2 k 
(k+1) Σ e. € Ker(T) and Im(T) = lh({x ,χ ,...,χ }). 
i=1 1 
Now let m := k+1+f and let A S M be such that 
mx» 
e.A = Te. for each i £ IN, ,, and 
ι ι k+1 
i-k-1 
e.A = r for each i e IN MN, ., 
ι m k+1 
We shall prove that v(A) = 0 and that 0^ T(A) = Y. 
k+1 
v(A) > 0 since ((k+1Γ Σ e.)A = (0,0,0,...). Let η ^  η and у € Y . 
i=1 1 
Then an(y) € lh(Y) Π S c = V П Sc. Hence 
e.Aa (y) = 0 for each i € IN. ,. 
ι η ^  k+1 
1 к because e.A £ lh({x χ }) for each i € IM .. 
In view of (*) we have 
e.Aa (y) = s (г1-111"1 )у < 0 for each i € IN\IN. ... 
So we have proved that V(A) = 0 and that Y = U a (Y ) с OÍjLU). 
— η η, Il 
η>η 
Now IH, ., с Е
Т
(А) С Е
Т
( А ) for each η > п. [The first inclusion k+1 I I n
 k + r 
follows from the fact that (k+1)~ Σ e. € 0 (A) and the second 
_ -^
1 
inclusion from II.k.6 (n >_ с (A)).] 
But then (in view of II.U.S): 
O J J U ) = {у € 3С;е.Ау* = 0 for each i € Г Н ^ , е^Ауг < 0 for 
each i € IN ΧΠί, _,, } = 
m k+l 
= {y £ SC; x V = 0 for each i e IH. , Γ ^ <_ 0 for each i ζ IHj,} = 
= V Π SC fi íy € SC·, r V 1 i 0 for each i e INf} = 
= lh(Y) Π SC Π {у € Sc; r1/* < 0 for each i e IN } = 
= U_ an(lh(Yn) Л S n Π {y 6 Sn; sn(r
1)yt < 0 for each i e IHf}) = 
n>n 
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(*) 
= U_ a
n
(Y
n
) = Y. 
n>n 
Thus we have proved t h a t (2) implies ( i ) . | 
§6.A η a x i o m a t i c c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e 
v a l u e o f f i n i t e a n d s e m i - i n f i n i t e 
m a t r i x g a m e s 
6.1 The purpose of th i s section is to generalize a theorem of E.I.Vilkas 
to semi-infinite matrix games. 
6.2 Let 
IM, := U{M ; m € IM, η € IH}, f mxn 
IM := IM, U U M u U M 
m£IN η€ΓΝ 
We quote (a s l i g h t modif icat ion of) VILKAS' Theorem (see [52] and 
[ 5 7 ] ) . 
Let f : IM •*• IR Ъе such that 
(1) f(A) = a if A = [a] € М ^ , 
(2) for each m,n 6 IN and each А,В e M with A ¿ В we have 
f(A) > f(B), 
(3) for each A e mf : Г(-А ) = -f(A), 
{h) for each m,n e IN and each A e M we have f(A) = f(B) if В 
is the (m+1)xn-matrix with rows х.е.А.е^А,...,e A, where χ is 
dominated by a convex combination of e^,... »eA, 
(5) for all А,В € IM, of the same size such that В can he obtained 
from A b£ a permutation of the rows of A we have f(A) = f(В). 
Then f(A) = v(A) for each A € IMf. 
[Conversely, it is not difficult to prove that f := ν has the five 
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mentioned properties.] 
6.3 DEFINITIONS 
Let A and В be subsets of IE (ГКП), let χ € IE (x € IEn) and 
ε > 0. 
We shall say that A ε-doniinates x, or that χ _is e-dominated Ъ^ ; A, 
if there exist a q € S and a sequence a..,a«,... in A such that 
CB 
Σ q.a. converges coordinatewise and 
j = 1 J J 
χ < I q.a. + el (χ < Σ q.a. + εΐ ). 
If A ε-dominates χ for each ε > 0, then we shall say that A 
dominates χ weakly, or that χ i_s_ weakly domonated by A. 
We shall say that A dominates В weakly, or that В із_ weakly dominated 
by A, if each b € В is weakly dominated by A. 
6.1+ REMARK 
Let A be a finite subset of ІЕП. Let χ £ ΙΕη be weakly dominated by 
A. Then χ is dominated by an element of ch(A). 
Proof: For each к e IN we can take a ρ С ch(A.) such that 
χ <_ ρ +k 1 , Since ch(A) is compact, we can take a convergent sub-
r(l) r(2) , 1 2 
sequence ρ ,p ,... of ρ ,p ,... 
Let ρ := lim р г ( і ) . Then χ <. ρ € ch(A). | | 
6.5 THEOREM 
The value-function ν : IM ->· IB has the following properties. 
(a) v(A) = a if A = [a] e M.^ , 
(b) For all А,В 6 IM of the same size with A >^  В we have V(A) >_ v(B). 
(c) For each A £ IM : νί-Α*) = -v(A). 
s 
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(d) Let A € IM . Let R Ъе a non-empty subset of the set of rows of 
A which is weakly dominated Ъу the set Τ consisting of the 
other rows. Then v(A) = v(B) if В is the matrix which we otitain 
from A by deleting those rows which are an element of R. 
Proof: (a) and (b) are obvious. 
(c) follows from 1.1.12. 
(d) We only prove (d) for an A € M^ (η Ç. IN). 
Let A1 := {i ε IH; еЛ e R}, Ag := Ш\А1 . Then 
(1) (в) = inf sup e.Aq. <_ inf sup e.Aq = v(A) . 
ciesr* ieA2
 1
 qesn іета 1 
Take an ε > 0. For each r € A. and each i € A« there is a q. >. 0 
such that 
Σ qT = 1 and e A < £ αΤ(θ.Α)+ε1 . 
ieA2 ieA2 
Take a ρ e Sc. Let ρ € S be the vector with p. = 0 for each i 6 A 
and p. = p. + Σ q.p for each i £ A„. 
ι i .^ ir 2 
reA1 
Then ρ e S and 
p B = Σ р.(е.А) = Σ р.(е.А) + Ι ρ Σ q^(e,A) > 
І€А2 іеА2 геА1
 Г
 ΐ€Α2 
> Σ р.(е.А) + Σ ρ (e A-el ) > pA-e1 . 
— -с. *ι ι _. *r r η —
 r
 η lÊA. reA. 
[ρ,, is the vector which we obtain from ρ by removing those coordi-
nates which correspond to the rows of A that play no role in В.] 
But then: 
(2) If v(A) e IR and ρ e 0^(A), then p^B > (ν(Α)-2ε)ΐ ; hence 
v(B) >_ v(A)-2e. 
(3) If v(A) = » and pA > ci for some с 6 IR, then p^B > (c-t)l ; 
— η b — η 
v(B) >_ c-ε. 
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In view of (l), (2) and (3) we may conclude that v(A) = v(B). || 
6.6 THEOREM 
Let g : IM ->· IE Ъе a function with the following properties. 
(a) g(A) = a if A = [a] £ Μ 1 χ 1. 
(b) For all А,В £ IM of the same size with A > В we have 
* s — 
g(A) > g(B). 
(c) For each A e IM : gí-A*) = -g(A). 
(d) Let A £ IM and let R be a non-empty subset of the set of rows 
of A which is weakly dominated by the set Τ consisting of the 
other rows. Then g(A) = g(B) if В is the matrix which we obtain 
from A by deleting those rows which are an element of R. 
Then g(A) = v(A) for each A ε IM . 
Proof : (1) In view of (c) and 1.1.12 the proof is completed if we 
show that g(A) = v(A) for each Α ε M (m £ IH, η ε Ш). 0
 mxn ' 
(2) First consider matrices with a (pure) saddle-point. 
If Α ε M (m ε IN, η ε IH) has a saddle-point in cell (i_,j
n
), i.e. 
mxn и и 
(*) a. . < a. . <a. . for each i ε IH , j ε IH , 
i,j 0- v J o - 10' J 
then (e. ,e. ) ε 0 (A) χ 0 (A) and V(A) = a. . . Now let 
10 J0 I і і 10 , J0 
η-
 r
^ ,m η "
 r
~
 η
ιη η 
A := [a. .]. . . . , A := [a. .] . , . . 
i,jJi=1,j = r I,JJI=1,J = 1 
be the mxn-matrices with â. . :=a. -ла. . and 
a. . :=a. .va. . for each (i,j) ε IN χ IN . 
ifJ i»J i,J0 m η 
Then from A <_ A <_ A we may conclude, in view of (b), that 
(**) g(Â) < g(A) < g(Á). 
Now the se t R := {e.A; i ε I H \ { i
n
} } i s dominated by {e. A}. This 1 m 0 1 
implies t h a t g(A) = g(D), where 
63 
D := [a. -a. a. -,...] (зее (d)). 
^' О' ^ 
In -D the j
n
-th row dominates the set of the other rows (see (*)). 
From (c), (d) and (a) ve may conclude: 
g(Â) = g(D) = -e(-Ob) = -(-a. • ) = a = v(A). 
0,J0 0 0 
In a similar manner we can show that g(A) = v(A). 
So, in view of (**), we have proved: 
g(A) = v(A) for each A € IM with a pure saddle-point. 
(3) Let A € M (m € IH, η £ IH) without a pure saddle-point such 
mxn 
that v(A) € IH. 
Let В Ъе the (m+1)xn-matrix with rows 
(А)і
п)е1А,е2А,... 
and С the (m+1 )x(n+1 )-matrix (»+1 := <») with columns 
v(A)l*
+1,Be;.Be*,... . 
m+1 
Take a ρ 6 0 (A). Then e ^ <_ ΐ p. (e.B). From (d) we may conclude 
i=2 1~ ·^ 
that g(A) = g(B). 
Let e > 0. Take an e-optimal strategy q(e) of player II in the c-
mixed extension of A. Then 
00 
Σ «i(e), .Се^ < (v(A)+e)1 ., = Се^ + e l * . 
• о J-1 J ηι+1 1 m+1 
Hence {-e-C1'} is weakly dominated Ъу {-e„C ,-e_C ,...}. 
From (c) and (d) we may conclude that g(C) = g(B). 
Because С has a pure saddle-point in cell (1,1) and с = v(A), we 
1 9 Τ 
get (in view of (2)) 
g(A) = g(B) = g(C) = c1 1 = v(A). 
So we have proved that g(A) = v(A) for each A € IM for which 
v(A) e IR. 
(h) Let A e M (m € IH, η e IH) with V(A) = -». 
mxn 
6U 
If we can show that g(A) <_ -c for each с > 0, then the proof of the 
theorem will be completed. 
Take а с > 0. Then we can find а к € IN with v(JL ) <_ -c (see II.2.2), 
Let A = [a. .]. , . , be the matrix with 
f a. · for each i € IN , j e IN, 
1. . := ^ m k 
1
"
:l
 la. . ν 0 for each i e IN , j € IN\IN, . i,j m' к 
It is easy to prove that v(A) = v(A ) € IB and A >^  A. 
Therefore v(Ä) = g(A) in view of (3). It follows from (ъ) that 
g(A) <_ g(A) <_ -c. Hence g(A) = -» = v(A). | | 
[l found this final form of the theorem after an inspiring discus­
sion with A.CM. van R00IJ.] 
6.7 REMABK 
Let f : IM» ^  IR he the restriction of g : IM •> IR in II.6.6 to IM... f s f 
Then we obtain from (a), (b), (с), (d) properties —say (a)', (b)', 
(с)', (d)1 —for f. It is not difficult to show that (a)1, (b)', 
(c)', (d)' are equivalent to (l), (2), (3), С*), (5) in II.6.2. 
[With the aid of II.6Л one can prove that {h) and (5) are equiva­
lent to (d').] 
§7. P e r t u r b a t i o n s o f t h e p a y - o f f s 
7.1 Let m € IN. Let d : M x M -»• [0,»] be the "metric" om M 
mx00 mx"1 mx™ 
defined by 
d(A,B) := sup {la. —b. . I ; i e IN ,j e IN} (А,В € M ). 
ι >J i> J πι mx™ 
[d determines in a natural way a topology on M .] 
mx» 
In this section we study the relations of values and (e-) optimal 
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strategies of the players in two matrix games whose distance is 
small. 
7.2 THEOREM 
Let А,В e M
m x e
 (me IN). Then |v(A)-v(B)| <.d(A,B). 11 (-»)-(-») | :=0.] 
Proof: If d(A,B) = <·, then we have nothing to prove. 
Suppose that d(A,B) e IH. Let J := [I]™. T_ . Then from 
B-d(A,B)j < A < B+d(A,B)j 
we may conclude (with the aid of II.6.5(13) and 1,1.15) thit 
v(B)-d(A,B) < v(A) < v(B)+d(A,B). 
So |v(B)-v(A)| < d(A,B).|| 
7.3 From II.7.2 we infer the following 
COROLLARY 
The subsets {A € M ; V(A) = -<·} and {A e M ; V(A) € IR} are 
open and closed in the metric space <M ,d>. 
7.1* THEOREM 
(1) Let Α,Β € Μ (m e IM). Suppose that V(A) = -» and d(A,B) e IR. 
ЩХ
0 0 
Then v(B) = -., OjU) = OjÍB) = Sm and O^ÍA) = O^ÍB). 
(2) Let A,В е м (m e IN). Suppose that V(A) € IR and let 
δ := d(A,B) € IR. Then 0^(B) с 0^+2δ(Α) and O^ÍB) <z O ^ U ) . 
Proof of (1). The equation v(B) = -" follows from II.7.2. Then 
O^A) = O^B) = Sm. 
Let q € O ^ U ) . Then 
e.Bq* < e.Aq^dU.B) = -· for each i € IH ;q € 0^
Х
(В). 
ι — ι ^ · m ^ II 
Hence O^ÍA) с O J T ^ ) ; likewise 0^(8) с O ^ U ) . 
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(2) Take a q. € О^ (B). Then 
e-Aq <_ е.(В+бі)д <_ ν(Β)+ε+ό <_ ν(Α)+ε+2δ for each i € IN . 
snee q € 0 ^ 2 6 ( А ) ; О^ (В) с 0 ^ 2 6 ( А ) . The proof 
sion in (2) can Ъе given in a similar manner. || 
He c ^2&(к)·, O ^ 2 (A). of the other inclu-
7.5 THEOREM 
Let A € M ( m e IN). Then for each open set U з 0_(A) there is a 
mx« j_ 
& > 0 such that 0
Т
(В) с U for each В С M with ά(Α,Β) < 5. I mx1" 
Proof: If v(A) = -", then the theorem is true in view of ΙΙ.7·Μΐ). 
Let V ( A ) € IB and suppose that the conclusion of the theorem is not 
true. Then there is an open set U* =) 0 (A) such that for each к £ IM 
there are a B k € M with d(A,Bk) < k-1 and a p k € 0x(Bk) such that mxco X 
ρ ¿ U * . Take a convergent subsequence ρ ,p ,... of ρ ,p ,... 
(S is compact). 
Let ρ := lim ρ . In view of II.7.2 we may conclude that 
i-x» 
lim v(B n ' ) = v(A) because lim d(B k,A) = 0. Then it follows from 
i-x» k-*» 
pn(i)Bn(i)et ^  v(Bn(i)) f o r e a c h j e хид e та> 
Ъу taking limits, that 
pAe. >_ v(A) for each j 6 IN. 
J 
Hence ρ £ 0 T(A). But this is in contradiction with the fact that 
pn(i) g u # f o r e a c h i £ jjj u n d t h e definition of p. || 
7.6 REMARKS 
(a) In II.7·5 we proved that the multifunction 0 T : M •*· S is 
1 m**0 
upper semi-continuous. We shall now prove that 0 X : M -»-S 
1 m*00 
is not lower semi-continuous (for m = 2 ) . For each η € IN, let 
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A(n) := 
Γ -1 -1 -ι 
η η η 
e Μ 2χ« 
and let 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
e м, 2χ= 
Th en ΟΛΑ11) = {e } for each η e IH, 0 (A) = S 2 and 
lim d(A(n),A) = 0. 
Пг+<» 
(b) We s h a l l now show ( for η = 2) t h a t О M -»• S is not upper 
mx«
1 
semi-continuous if on M we put the topology of cellwise con-
mx» 
vergence. 
Ί
2 ш For each η € IH l e t A(n) = [a . . ( η ) ] . . ._1 be 2xo>-matrix with 
го if j e iN\{n} ( ι if j e m\{n} 
a .(n) :=< and a 0 .(n) :=< 
1 , 0
 1-1 if j = η ¿,J 1-2 if j = η 
Then the sequence A(1),A(2),... converges cellwise to 
Ό 0 0 
1 1 1 
but О Л А С П ) ) = {e.,} for each η € IH and OjU) = ie2}. 
(c) We shall now show, that an analogous assertion as made in II.7.5 
r.m for 0, M -+ S does not hold for the multifunction 
mx« 
M 
II " "mx« 
For each η € IH, let 
A(n) := [0 1 2"1 3"1 ... n"1 0 (n+2)"1 (n+3)"1 ...] € M^ 
and let A := [0 1 2~1 3"1 h'^ 
Then d(A(n),A) = (n+1 )"1 •* 0 if η -*• ». 
For each η € IH : O^UÍn)) = ch({e1 .en+2} ), and O ^ U ) = {e^. 
Hence for each η € IN and each ε € (0,2) we have 
O^UU)) Φ U^O^U)) := {q. e Sc; Hq-eJ), < ε}. 
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7.Τ THEOREM 
Let A € M such that 0T(A) consists of exactly one element — mx» I 
say p. 
1 ρ V 
Let В -В .... Ъе a sequence in M with lim (Β ,Α) = 0. 
mx™ , 
1 2 к \г 
Let ρ ,р , . . . Ъе a sequence with ρ € 0_(ВК) for each к € ΓΝ. Then 
It 
lim ρ = p . 
к-*» 
Proof: Let ε > 0. By II.T.5 ve can find a 6 > 0 such that for each 
В £ M with d(A,B) < δ we have 0T(B) с {χ e S
m
; I|x-p|I, < e}. 
Take a К e IN such that d(Bk,A) < 6 for each к > К. Then 
р
к
 € OJCB11) С {x6Sm;| ΙΧ-ΡΙ Ι , < ε}; I |pk-p| | , < ε f or each к > К. 
So lim ρ = p. Il 
7.θ DEFINITION 
We call an mx«o-matrix game A (m € IM) I-completely mixed if for each 
ρ € 0 (A) : p. > 0 for each i e ΠΙ . [See also [23].] 
7.9 THEOREM 
The collection of I-completely mixed mx^-matrix games (m € IN) is 
an open subset of M 
* mx» 
Proof: Take a I-completely mixed A € M
 ш
. Then we can take an ε > 0 
such that for each 
χ € U {0 (A)):= {χ € Sm;| |x-p| |
 1 < ε f or some ρ € O^A)} 
we have x. > 0 for each i £ IN . Take a δ > 0 such that 
ι m 
0T(B) с U (0_(A)) for each В € M with d(A,B) < δ. Then the open 
Ι ε I mx» 
set {B € ^ x ; d(A,B) < δ} is a subset of the collection of I-com­
pletely mixed mx«>-matrix games. | | 
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7.10 REMARK 
2 °° 
Let A = [a. • ] . , . , be the 2x«>-matrix with a, . = 1 and a. . = О 
iti i=1 10 = 1 I.J 2,j 
for each j e IN. Then each В e M 0 with d(A,B) < i is not I-com-
¿x« 
pletely mixed. Hence the set of I-completely mixed 2x°>-matrix games 
is not dense in M 0 
¿XOD 
7 . 1 1 THEOREM 
Let m € IN. Let BM be the set of bounded mx">-matrices with 
mx» 
metric d : BM χ BM •+ IR as defined in II.7.1. 
mx<= mx"» 
f 
Then the multifunction 0.,.-,. : BM •+ S has a closed graph. 
II mx°> 0 r 
Proof: Let A,A(1),A(2),A(3),... be a sequence of elements of BM 
~~~"~"~ mx"* 
and q.,q( 1 ) ,(i(2) ,q(3),.. . a sequence of elements of S such that 
lim d(A(n),A) = 0, lim | |<i(n)-q| | ., = 0 and q(n) e 0^
τ
(Α(η)) for 
each η £ IN. It follows from 
lim v(A(n)) = v(A) (see II.7.2), 
п-и» 
e.A(n)q(n) < v(A ) for each i e IN and each η 6 IN, and 
ι
 —
 η m 
|e.A(n)a(n)t-eiAqt| <_ | eiA(n)ii(n)t-eiAq(n)t| +| eiAq(n)t-eiAqt| <. 
<. d(A(n),A)+d(A,0)| |q(n)-q| | for each i € IN 
that 
e.Aq < v(A) for each i € IN . 
ι — m 
so q e OJJCA). 11 
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CHAPTER III 
INFINITE MATRIX GAMES 
§ 1 . M i x e d e x t e n s i o n s o f i n f i n i t e m a t r i x 
g a m e s 
1.1 In II.1.2 we have seen that not all probability vectors in 1 can 
be used as mixed strategies for player II in an arbitrary mx«-
matrix game. For infinite matrix games we get at least similar pro-
blems. Let us look at the following 
EXAMPLE 
Let A 6 M be the matrix with 
«Xoo 
Í O i f i > j or i+2 <_ j 2 - i f i = ò 
- 2 2 І + 1 i f j - i + 1 . 
Then (рА)р = 1 and р(Ар ) = 0 i f ρ := ( 2 " 1 , Ι Γ 1 , 8 " 1 , . . . ) e S. 
1.2 Let A £ M . Let 
«Жш 
SA := {q € S; I a. .q. £ [-" ,») for each i € TS} , 
j - 1 1 , J J 
S. := {p £ S; Ζ p . a . . e (-»,»] for each j e I N } . 
А с 
Then S and S eire convex subsets of S conta ining S , and 
(pA)q = p(Aq ) for each (p,q) E SC x S C , (p,q) С SC' χ S , 
(p,q) e s A χ S c . 
The two-person zero-sum games 
<S C,S C,E A>, <SA,S
C
,EA> and <S
C
,S A,E A>, 
with EA(p,q) := pAq for each (p,q) £ S
c
 χ S C, (p,q) £ S. x S C and 
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с А (PJI) E S Χ S respectively, are called the c-mixed extension, 
rc-mixed extension and the cr-mixed extension of the matrix game A 
respectively. 
1.3 The cf-mixed extension (fc-mixed extension, f-mixed extension) of a 
one-sided bounded «x^-matrix game A is the two-person zero-sum game 
<SC,S,E > (<S,SC,E >, <S,S,E >) where E is defined in the obvious 
§2. R e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e u p p e r a n d l o w e r 
v a l u e s o f t h e v a r i o u s m i x e d e x t e n s i o n s 
o f a n i n f i n i t e m a t r i x g a m e 
2.1 We have seen in II.2.2 and II.2.h that the various mixed extensions 
of semi-infinite matrix games have a value. It is well-known that 
the f-mixed extension of a bounded »«»-matrix game does not neces­
sarily have one. For the convenience of the reader we give the fol­
lowing example of A. Wald ([58] p.282). 
Let A € M be the (bounded symmetric) matrix game with a. . = 1 
»x» 1,J 
if i > j, a. . = 0 if i = j and a. . = -1 if i < j. i.J i.J 
Then the f-mixed extension (and also each of the other introduced 
mixed extensions) of A has lower value -1 and upper value 1. [See 
III.2.9, III.3.2 and III.2.6.] 
2.2 Let A 6 M^ . In the following we shall denote the upper values of 
<SC,SC,EA>, <SA,SC,EA> and <SC,SA,EA> by v^A), v ^ U ) and v ^ U ) ; 
the lower values by ν (A), ν (A) and ν (A); the spaces of minimax 
—с —re —er 
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strategies by 0TT(A), 0TT(A) and O T T ( A ) ; and the spaces of maximin 
strategies Ъу 0°(A), 0^ C(A) and 0^Г(А). 
f f 
For a one-sided tounded A G M : v_(A), Vp(A), 0 T ( A ) , 0 T T(A) 
respectively are the notations for the upper value, the lower value, 
the maximin strategy space and the minimax strategy space of the 
f-mixed extension of A. The meaning of ν
 f(A), v. (A), ν „(A),... 
for a one-sided bounded A 6 M will he obvious. 
cox« 
2.3 For the mixed extension of a finite matrix game both optimal stra­
tegy spaces are non-empty (see 1.2.6). For an mx»-matrix game A we 
have seen that 0T(A) φ φ and that 0 (Α), Ο-,^Α) may or may not be 
empty (see 11.2.2, II.3.5 and ΙΙ.3.Ό. For the mixed extensions of 
an »x»-matrix game with a value, we have four possibilities: both, 
none or either of the strategy spaces may be empty, as we can see 
from the following 
EXAMPLES 
(1) Let A e M such that a. . > 0 for each i,j € IH and such that 
ooxoo X.J 
there is а с € IB with Σ a. . < с for each i £ IM. 
f f J η -1 г 
Then 0*(A) = S, OJJÍA) = «S, vf(A) = 0 (and Σ η е^. € O ^ U ) 
-1 ^ 
if η > ce ). 
ƒ 0 if χ φ j 
(2) Let A be the «•«»-matrix wit'i a. . : = \ 
1
"
]
 1-1 if i = j 
Then vf(A) = Ο, θ£(Α) = (¡S, c£ (A) = S. [See III.2.11 and 1.1.12.] 
(3) For the matrix [l]"_1 "=1 we have: vf(A) = 1, Q^k) = O ^ U ) = S. 
(U) Let A be the ««»-matrix with a. . = 1 and a. . , = -1 for each 
1,1 1,1+1 
i € IN, and with a. . = 0 if j Φ i and j φ i+1. Then v„(A) = 0, 
1 , J 1 
Oj(A) = φ and O J J U ) = <t. 
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ι n 
Proof: Let р П := η" ΐ е. (η e ПИ). Then from 
i-1 1 
pnA = η- Ί
β ι
-η-
1
6 Α 1 > -η
- 1! , А(рп) = η - ^ * < іГ 
1 η+ ι — ш Π — <» 
we may conclude: v.(A) >_ -η , _(А) <_ η for each η € IN. 
So v.(A) = 0. Let p e s . There exists an i £ TN such that 
t f 
p. > Ρ·
+
ι> and then pAe. . < 0. Hence 0 T(A) = ¿. A similar ar-
gument can he used to show that 0 (A) = $. || 
2.1* THEOREM 
Let A € M . Then: 
ШХсо 
(1) v^A) = v,
r
(A) < v
cr
(A) < v
e
(A). 
(2) v^A) < ^ ( A ) < 7
rc
(A) = 7
c
(A). 
(3) If the c-mixed extension of A has a value, then the cr- and re­
mixed extensions have the same value. 
Proof : (l) ν (A) = sup inf pAq. = sup inf pAe. = 
"^ pesc qesc p€sc jera ·> 
=
 s
^c ^ Α
ρ Α
^
 =
^ r
( A )
· 
p e S
 ^
8
 , , с A 
For the first inequality in (1) see 1.1.7. Because S с S , we have 
v
cr
(A) < v
c
(A). 
(2) can be proved in a similar manner as (1), while (3) immediately 
follows from ( 1 ) and ( 2 ). 11 
2.5 THEOBEM 
Let A e M . Let A he the mx»-matrix (m e ΓΝ) with rows 
«χ« m,™ 
е
л
к,е„А,...,e A, and A the »xn-matrix (n £ IN) with columns 
ι ¿ m «,η 
t t t Ae1,Ae„,...,Ae . Then: 
(1) lim v(A ) and lim v(A ) exist. 
m,» »,η 
m-*» η-*«
0 
(2) If A is upper hounded, then v.(A) = lim v(A ) and ν (A) = v_(A). 
—ι m tœ —с —ι 
Ih 
(3) If A is lower bounded, then v„(A) = lim v(A ) and ν (A) = v„(A). 
1 »,η с f 
ir*» 
Proof: (a) From II.2.2 and 1.1.12 we know that v(A ) and v(A ) 
m," œ,n 
exist for each m,n € IN. In a similar manner as in (a) of the proof 
of II.2.2 one can show that 
v(A, ), v(A,. ),... is a non-decreasing sequence and 
v(Aœ . ) , ν(Α
β
 _ ) , . . . is a non-increasing sequence in IB. 
Hence (l) is proved. 
We shall now prove (2). [The proof of (3) can Ъе given in a similar 
manner, or with the aid of 1.1.12.] 
(b) From 
v.(A) = sup inf pAe. >^  sup inf pAe. = 
p€s jera J (p1,...,pm,o,o,...)es jera J 
= sup inf pA e. = v(A ) for each m € IN 
pes* jera m · " J 
we may conclude that v„(A) > lim v(A ). 
^ Т — ТП -CD 
(c) Suppose that v(A ) = -» for each m e IN. Then, according to 
m,<» 
II.3.3, for each m € IN there exists a q e S with e.A(q ) = -=> 
for each i e IN . 
m 
OD 
For q := Σ 2~ q e S we have: e.Aq = -=> for each i € IN (see (c) 
m=1 1 
of the proof of II.3.3). Hence -» = V J A ) = lim v(A ). 
ι т,
ш 
m-«" 
(d) Suppose that lim v(A ) e IR. Let e > 0. We shall show that 
there is an m 6 IN such that v„(A) < v(A )+e for each m > m. 
—1 — m,» — 
f· 
In view of 1.1.15 we suppose w.l.o.g. that ν (A)-e > 0. 
Take a ρ € S with pAe. > ν.(Α)-5ε for each j e IN; and take an 
m e i N such that 
s := Σ_ p. < lee л 1, 
i=m+1 1 
where с := sup {a. ·; i € IN, j € IN} > 0. 
ι »J 
75 
Let ρ := (l-s)~ (p1,Ρρ,...,ρ-,0,0,...). Then s (ρ) e S
m
 for each 
m >_ m and 
OD 
pAe.-( 1-s)pAe. = Σ _ p.a. . <_ sc < 5e, 
J J
 i=m+1 1 1 , J 
(l-s)pAe. > pAe.-je > ν^(Α)-ε, 
pAe^ > (і-з)"1( ^(А)-
е
) > ν.(Α)-ε for each j € IH. j —f f 
Hence 
"t f 
v(A ) > inf s (p)A e. = inf pAe. > ν (A)-e 
m
'- -jeiH m m - J jera J - -
for each m > m; lim v(A ) > ν (Α)-ε. 
— m,» 
m-x» 
f· 
In view of (b) we may conclude that lim v(A ) = ν (A). 
m,
0
» -
nr+œ 
(e) Because a (S ) с S с S for each m e IM, we have 
m 
v(A ) < ν (A) < v j A ) for each m e IN. 
m,™ с — ^ т 
With the aid of (c) and (d) we infer 
v.(A) = lim v(A ) < ν (A) < v.(A). 
—r m,*
1
» с г 
m-w> ' 
Hence v„(A) = ν (A). 11 
—I —с ' ' 
2.6 In view of theorems II.2.2 and III.2.5» for an upper hounded matrix 
game A we have 
v-(A) = lim lim v(A ) 
—I m.n 
m-ьоо η-*
0 0 
and for a lower hounded matrix game A 
v.(A) = lim lim v(A ) 
f m.n 
η-H» m-HB 
where A := [a. .]* . " . (if A = [a. . ] " " , ) . 
m,n I,JJI=1,J=1 1,J i=1,J=1 
2.7 The proof of the next theorem is left to the reader. 
THEOREM 
Let A be an upper bounded »»«»-matrix. Then: 
(1) vjA) = v ^ U ) = v ^ U ) = ^ (A) < vf(A) = vcf(A) < ν ¿A) = vfc(A). 
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(2) If ν (A) exists, then ν (A), ν (A) and ν (A) exist, and they 
eire equal to ν (A). 
(3) If v. (A) exists, then all mixed extensions have the same value. 
(k) If ν .(A) exists, then v-U) = ν „(A). 
CI I CI 
(5) If vf(A) exists, then vf(A) = ν f(A). 
2.8 The following theorem is also given without a proof. 
THEOREM 
Let A € M he lower bounded. Then 
œxœ 
V (A) = V. (A) = ν .(A) = v„(A) > v_(A) = b, (A) > ν (A) = ν „(A). 
с fc cf f — т ^ т с с -ci 
2.9 Fromm.2.7 and III.2.8 we infer the following 
THEOREM 
Let A be a bounded »^«-matrix. If one of the mixed extensions has a 
value, then all of them do, and all values are equal. 
2.10 Note that for one-sided bounded »»«»-matrix games the upper value of 
an arbitrary mixed extension is always greater than or equal to all 
lower values of the various mixed extensions (see III.2.7 and 
III.2.8). That this is not necessarily the case for an arbitrary 
«>x»-matrix game can be seen from the following 
EXAMPLES 
(a) Let A be the matrix introduced in III.1.1. Then S. = S = S. 
'" _i_1 A 
Let ρ := Σ і2 е. € S = S,. Then from 
i=1 A 
pA = (1,2,1*, 8,...) and (Ар ) = (-1 ,-2,-U,-8,. . . ) 
we may conclude that 
ν (A) > 1 > -1 > ν (A). 
—re - - er 
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(b) Let A be the "««-matrix discussed in t5]> where a. . = i-j for 
1
 >J 
each i,j £ IN. Then it is easy to see (by calculating pA and 
t œ 
Ар for ρ := Σ 2"1e .) that 
i=1 2 1 
ν (A) = ν (A) = "> and ν (A) = ν (A) = -"•. 
re с er —с 
2.11 In III.2.5 we have seen that ν (A) = ν (A) for a lower bounded 
с f 
matrix game A. Furthermore,we know from III.2.8 that ν (A) <_ v.(A) 
for such a game. 
We shall now look at a class of lower bounded <»xŒ-"diagonal" games 
(see [23] p.'tTP for finite diagonal games). We shall see that for 
some of these games the lower value of the c-mixed extension is 
really smaller than the (lower) value of the f-mixed extension. 
THEOREM 
Let a..,ap,... be an infinite sequence of positive real numbers. 
Let A be the »»«»-matrix with a. · = a. for each i G IN and a. . = 0 
ι«
1
 ι liJ 
if i / j. Then: 
(1) v(A ) = 0 for each mi И, 
m,
00 
-1 
v(A ) = ( Σ a.) for each η e ΠΙ. 
'
η
 i=1 
00 
(2) If Σ a. = », then vf(A) = 0, oJU) = S and O ^ U ) = ¿. 
i=1 
(3) If Σ ai € IR, then vf(A) = ( Σ a.)"
1
, 0^(A) = O ^ U ) = 
i=1 i=1 1 
= {vf(A)(a1,a2,...)}, and v^U) = 0 < v f (A). 
Proof: From e-Ae ,, = О for each i € IH and the fact that 
ι m+1 m 
A > [0]° . Τ , it follows that v(A ) = 0. Let 
m,» — ·
,
ι=1 ,j = 1 m,» 
η
 1 
ρ := ( Ϊ a i)" (a1,a2 a ) e S
n
. 
i=1 
Then from 
7Θ 
t n 1 
a (p)A е. = ( Σ a.) for each j € IN , 
( n -1 (Σ a.) for each i £ IN 
л 't I · ι ι n 
e.A ρ =<; i=l 
ι -,η λ 
I. 0 for each i 6 ΓΝ\ΙΝ 
π 
η 
we may conclude that v(A ) = ( Σ a.)" . Thus (1) is proved. 
i=1 1 
(2) and (3) In view of III.2.5 (3), we have 
It is obvious that V-(A) > 0. Hence v.(A) = 0 if ς a. = •=; and 
—r — ι . , ι 
f f 1 = 1 
CC(A) = S, 0 (A) = i for that case. 
-1 
Let now Σ a. e Π?. Since pA = ( Σ a.) 1 for 
X . 1 * 
„1=1 _1 i=1 
ρ := ( j; a. )~ (a^a^,...) € S, we may conclude that 
i=1 1 ¿ 
ν (A) = ( Σ а. Γ 1 . 
i=1 
f f 
Now Лк) (a1 ,a„,.. . ) is an element of 0 (A) and also of 0 (A) . 
With the aid of an obvious variant of II.U.3 for »>x«>-matrix games 
it follows that OJEA) = O ^ U ) = {vf (A)(a1 ,a2,. .. )}. 
Let ρ e Sc. Then , for an η e IN with p. = 0 for each i >_ n, we 
have pAe = 0. So ν (A) <_ 0; ν (A) = 0 < ν (A). | | 
Ш 
• Note that lim v(A ) = 0 φ ν J A) if Σ a. € IR. 
m.» Γ .
 ч
 ι 
m«· * 1=1 
2.12 In II.3.7 we proved that for a one-sided bounded mx^-matrix game 
(m e IN) with finite value: 0* U) І І iff O J T U ) φ <t>. 
Now look at the following 
EXAMPLE 
Let 
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A : = 
0 0 0 0 0 
- 1 1 1 1 1 
1-3 1 ι ι 
1 1-7 1 ι 
1 1 1 -15 1 
One can show that 
vjA) = 0, 0*L(A) = i(2-1,2-2,2"3,...)}, 0fT(A) = 0^т(А)ПЗ II II1 II4 
0^(A) = сЫе^О.г" 1^" 2^" 3,...)}, v
c
(A) = 1, v^A) = vf(A) = 0. 
§3. S o m e c o n d i t i o n s g u a r a n t e e i n g t h a t 
m i x e d e x t e n s i o n s o f i n f i n i t e m a t r i x 
g a m e s h a v e a v a l u e 
3.1 THEOREM 
Let A be a bounded «»««-matrix and let A (m,n 6 IN) be the matrix 
m,n 
defined in III.2.6. Then the following two assertions are equiva­
lent. 
(1) The f-mixed extension of A has a value. 
(2) lim lim v(A ) = lim lim v(A ). 
m,η m,η 
m-H» η-*» η-*«" m-w> 
Proof: The theorem follows immediately from III.2.6. || 
3.2 EXAMPLES 
(1) For the Wald-game of III.2.1 we have 
!
1 if η < m 
0 if η = m 
-1 if η > m. 
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Hence 
lin lim V(A ) = - W 1 = lim lim v(A ); 
m,n m,n 
the f-mixed extension of A has no value. 
f-1 if i Φ j 
(2) For the »x^-matrix game A vith a. . := \ we have 
1 , J
 I 0 if i = j 
Í -1 if η > m 
ν ( Α
™ „> ={ ι 
' L-1+n if η £ m 
So 
lim lim v(A ) = lim lim v(A ) = -1 ; v.(A) = -1. 
m,n m,n г 
m-*» η-«" η-*· D^ x» 
3.3 From 111.2.5(2) we infer 
THEOREM 
Let А Ъе an upper bounded «x^-matrix. Then the f-mixed extension of 
A has a value iff v„(A) = lim v(A ). [For the definition of A 
1 m,™ т,ш 
m-«» 
see III.2.5.] 
ЪЛ REHABK 
For bounded »x^-matrix games III.3.3 was proved by A. Wald in [58]. 
3.5 THEOREM 
Let A be an upper bounded «>x»>-matrix such that inf a. . = -«> for 
jeiN 1 , J 
each i € IN. Then the f-mixed extension of A has value -». 
Proof : v(A ) = -« for each m e IN (in view of II.3.3). 
т,™ 
From (c) of the proof of III.2.5 we may conclude that v„(A) = -".11 
3.6 DEFINITION 
We shall say that an "x^-matrix game A is weakly finite for player 
I if for each e > 0 there is a finite subset F of IN such that 
8] 
{е.A; i £ F} ε-dominates each element of {e.A; i £ IN}. 
[See II.6.3.] 
3.7 THEOREM 
Let А Ъе an »»«»-matrix game which is weakly finite for player I. 
Then all introduced mixed extensions of A have a value. 
Proof: In view of theorem 111.2.14(3) it is sufficient to prove that 
the c-mixed extension of A has a value. 
Take an ε > 0. Let F Ъе a finite subset of ГИ — say of m elements — 
such that 
{e.A; i £ F} ε-dominates each element of {e.A; i 6 IW}. 
W.l.o.g. we suppose that F = IN . Let А Ъе the mx«>-matrix defined 
m m,« 
in III.2.5. 
Since a (S ) с S we have 
m 
(*) ν (A) > v U ). 
-с — m,« 
For each i € ΓΝ\ΙΝ take an χ € 8 such that 
m 
e.A < χ^ Ά + εΐ . 
ι — m,
00
 » 
Take a ρ £ S c and let ρ := (p., »Pg»· · · »Ρ >0,0,...) + Ζ p.a (x1). 
i=m+1 1 
Then p e s 0 , s (ρ) € Sm and 
m » 
s (P)A = pA = Σ p.(e.A) + Σ p.a (x.1)A = 
m m,™ . , ΐ ι ,, ι m 
' 1=1 i=m+1 
Ш Οβ OÙ OD 
= Σ p.(e.A) + Σ р.хЧ > Σ ρ.(θ.Α)-ε( Σ ρ.) 1 > 
ι=1 i=m+1 ι=1 i=m+1 
>^  ρΑ-ε1
β
. 
Hence 
(*+) sup pA Q. ì. sup pAq -ε for each q e S . 
p€Sm m ,° pesc 
If v(A ) = -">, then (**) implies that ν (A) = -«>; and then ν (A) = m,« ^ * г с с 
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If v(A
 œ) € IE, then (*) and (**) imply: ν (A) £ IB, ν (A) e IR 
and 
ν (A)-v (A) < (v(A )+ε)-ν(Α ) = ε, 
с —с — m,™ m," 
and we may conclude that ν (A) exists. || 
3.8 REMARKS 
(1) Look at the »x">-matrix game, introduced in 111.2.3(^). 
From this game we can see that not each »x^-matrix game for 
which each mixed extension has a value is necessarily weakly 
finite for one of the players. 
(2) A weak version of III.3.7, which immediately follows from III.3.7, 
is: 
Let А Ъе an »x^-matrix game such that for each ε > 0 there is a 
finite subset F of ΓΗ such that for each i € IN\F there is a 
к £ F with e.A < e A + el . Then ν (A) exists. 1 — к =° с 
This weak version can also he proved using a theorem of Teh [50]. 
From the following example we can see that this version is real­
ly weaker. 
EXAMPLE 
Let A be the »xc-matrix with a, - = a _ , = 2 , a. . = -2 for each 
1,2 2,1 1,1 
i € IN and a. . = 0 elsewhere. 
i.J 
Then A is weakly finite for player I because 
2e„A + se^ A > e.A for each i > 3, 
1 2 — 1 — 
but there is no finite subset F of rows of A such that each 
other row is 1-dominated by one of the elements of F. 
3.9 From the work of M. de Wilde [63] one can derive the following 
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theorem for ""«»»-matrix games. 
THEOREM 
Let A be a bounded »»x^ -matrix. Suppose that for each pair of sequences 
x(l),x(2),... and y(l),y(2),... 
in S we have 
lim lim xdOAyd) 1 >. lim lim xdOAyd)* 
k-K«» i-w» 1-х» k-**0 
if both these double limits exist. 
Then the c-mixed extension of A has a value. 
3.10 The following theorem is (essentially) due to A.L. DULMAGE and 
J.E.L. PECK [12]. 
I shall give an alternative proof, which was found in cooperation 
with F. DELBAEN. 
THEOREM 
Let A = [a. . ] . , . . e M . Suppose that for each л € Ш 
i,jJi=1,0 = 1 »χ» ^ ü 
(*) inf a. . = lim a. . € IR. 
іеін
 1,;¡
 i-*» 1,J 
Then ν (A) exists and o£(A) ϊ φ . [v f c(A) := (5,3
С
)Е д).] 
Proof: Let c. := lim a. . for each j € ΓΝ, 
i->* 
1 1(ΓΝ) := {(ρ.,Ρ;,,...;?.) e I R ™ ; |pJ + Σ |p.| < - } , 
ieiN 
S (ІЙ) := {(ρ,,ρ^,... jp ) € IR"™; ρ >0,p.>0 for each i € ΓΝ, 
P. + τ Pi и ТЬ 
іета 
та 
с := {(χ·! ,х2,... ) e IR ; lim x^^ £ IR}. 
І-И" 
Note that (*) implies that (Aq ) € с for each q £ S c. 
Provide с with the sup-norm. Then the dual space с' of с can be 
identified with 1 (IN). [To each f £ с' there corresponds an element 
81* 
(ρ ,ρ ,...;p ) e 1 (IN) such that f(χ.,x0,...) = Σ ρ.χ.+ρ lim χ. 
ie та ι-*« 
for each (x..,x„,...) € c. This correspondence is a linear bijection 
of c' onto 11(IN).] 
It follows from Alaoglu's Theorem (see [3] p.272) that 3(ІИ) is a 
σ(ΐ (IN),c)-compact subset of 1 (IN). 
Now look at the two-person zero-sum game <3(ΙΉ)
>
3 ,E> where 
OD 
Í((pl,p2,.-.;pa,),(q1,q?,.··)) := Σ Σ ρ a. .q. + ρ Σ с q. = 
= Z p.ÍAq*). + ρ lim((Aqt)t). for each (ρ. ,ρ ,... ;ρ ) € 8(Й) 
•/-Τ-.Τ ι ι ш · ι ι ¿ » 
and each q € S . 
Then we have: 
(1) S(ra) is convex and σ(ΐ (IN),c)-compact. 
(2) E : S(IN) x S C •+ IE is bilinear. 
(3) For each q € S the map 
(Рі>Р2і---;Рш) '—* ^((р^Рд,...;?^),^) 
from Sim) into IH is continuous with respect to the 
σ(1 (IN),с)-topology on 3(ΓΝ). 
In view of (1), (2) and (3) we may conclude from the minimax theorem 
of F. Terkelsen ([51] p.1*09) that <S(ÍÑ),SC,E> has a value and that 
0I(S(ïi'),Sc,I) φ φ. Let (ρ1,ρ2,...;ροο) € 0I(S(ÎN) ,SC,Ï). Using (*), 
we may conclude that also (р1
+
Р
св
,Р2,Р3 ,. · · ;0) € О (S(lH) ,S
C
 ,E). 
[c. < a, . for each j G IN.] Let ρ := ((ρ,+ρ ,p0,...) € S. Then J — 1 .J ι => ¿ 
pAq* = E((p1+pe),p2,p3,...;0),(q1,q2,...)) for each q С S c. 
Hence 
V - J A ) > inf pAq* = (3(та),3С,Ё). 
qesc 
Furthermore, 
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ν (A) = inf sup pAq* = inf sup E ( ( p , , p 2 , . . . ; 0 ) , q ) < v ( S ( l N ) , S C , E ) . 
qesc pes qesc pes 
Therefore ν (A) exists and ρ e 0 (A) 4 φ. \ \ 
11 REMARK 
A necessary and s u f f i c i e n t condi t ion for bounded »xw-matrix games 
t o have a value can Ъе found in [З1*] ρ·2ΐ+7> ρ·255. 
. O p t i m a l s t r a t e g y s p a c e s o f m i x e d e x ­
t e n s i o n s o f » x o ' - m a t r i x g a m e s 
1 In a s i m i l a r manner as in I I . 3 . 1 7 i t can Ъе proved t h a t for mixed 
extensions of an A € M v i t h a v a l u e , t h e optimal s t r a t e g y spaces 
ooXoo 
are convex subsets of S. 
2 DEFINITION 
Let A £ M such that ν (A) exists. Then 
шхш с 
f» if v(A ) < ν (A) for each m e IN 
l min {m e ΓΝ: v(A ) = ν (A)} otherwise 
m," с 
and 
г» if v(A ) > ν (A) for each η e IN 
cII(A) := -'
n C 
'•min {η e IN: v(A ) = ν (A)} otherwise 
« ,n с 
are called the critical numbers of the matrix game A for player I 
and player II respectively. 
3 In a similar manner as in II.3-9 one can prove (using theorem 
II.2.2): 
CjU) < - iff Oj(A) 5* rf, 
cII(A) < » iff OjjCA) i φ. 
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h.к We invite the reader to construct «»«"-matrix games A for which ν (A) 
exists and 
(1) CjU) < », CII( A) * "> 
(2) CjU) < », cII(A) = », 
(3) CjU) = -, CJJCA) < » 
respectively. 
From example 111.2.3(1*) and also from the following theorem (which 
I found after I had seen the construction of the (k+1)x(k+1)-matrix 
game (k € IN) with prescribed unique strategies on page 70 of [25]), 
we can see that there are also bounded »x»-matrix games A for which 
ν (A) exists and с (A) = с (A) = ». 
1*.5 THEOREM 
Let p,q € S and suppose that p. > 0 and q. > 0 for each i E IN. 
Then there exists a bounded A £ M with ν (A) = v_(A) = 0, 
»X» C I 
θ£(Α) = OjjtA) = Φ, oJ(A) = {p} and oJjÍA) = {q}. 
œ 
Proof: Let A be the ««»-matrix with a, , := ΐ p.q. , a, . := -p.q, 
' i=2 *J J 
for each j > 2, a. - := -p-q- for each i > 2, a. . := p.q. for each 
— i,1 1 1 — 1,1 r1^l 
i > 2, and a. . := 0 elsewhere. 
Then A is bounded, pAe· = 0 for each j € IN and e.Aq = 0 for each 
i 6 IH. Hence vf(A) = ν (A) = 0, {p} с 0^(А), {q} с O ^ U ) and 
Ej(A) = Ej (A) = IM. So (by a variant of II.U.l*) we have: χ £ O£(A) 
t f t 
iff xAe. = 0 for each j e TS; y € 0 (λ) iff e.Ay = 0 for each 
f f 
i € Hi. But then we may conclude that O-JA) = {ρ}, 0 (A) = {q}. 
Hence 0°(A) = θ£(Α) П S C = «i and O^ÍA) = O^ÍA) П S c = <¡í. | | 
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THEOREM 
Let A £ M such that ν (A) exists. 
œxœ С 
Then we have: 
(1) If с (A) < », then Oj(A) = U a
m
( V A m « ^ ' 
rn^CjÍA) ' 
If cTT(A) < -, then 0°T(A) = U a (0TT(A )). 11 11 /.\ η 11 »,η 
n^ Cj-jlA) ' 
(2) If с (A) < » and =TT(A) < «, then 
0°(A) = U a ( Π 0T(A )), J- ^ / д \ т ^ /«^  1 ш , п 
m>_cI(A) n>c (A) 
0°T(A) = U в. ( Π 0TT(Am )). 
n^ c (A) m^cI(A) 
[Note that c(A ) < cTT(A) if v(A ) = ν (A). This can be proved 
m,eo — II
 m)a> с 
as follows. Suppose that cTT(A) = η 6 IN. Then 
ν (A) = V(A ) > v(A ) > v(A ) = ν (A). 
c
4 v
 «>tn — m,n — m,·»' с 
Hence v(A ) = v(A ) and thus c(A ) < η = cTT(A).] m,n m," m,» — II 
Ц.Т Without proof we state the following theorem (see II.S·'*, III.^.6 
(1) and 11.3.17(1)). 
THEOREM 
Let Y be a non-empty subset of S C and let Y := s (a (Sm) Π Y). 
m m m 
Then the following two assertions are equivalent. 
(1) There exists an A € M such that v(A) = 0, 0°(A) = Y and 
o^U) = 4. 
(2) For each m € IN, Y i s a compact convex subset of S . 
§5. S y m m e t r i z a t i o n s o f i n f i n i t e m a t r i x 
g a m e s 
5.1 The purpose of this section is to extend the symmetrization proce-
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dures for finite matrix games, descried Ъу Gale,Kuhn and Tucker in 
[16] and by von Neumann in [7] , to »»«»-matrix games. 
5.2 A matrix game A £ К (m € IN) is symmetric if A = -A . From 1.1 .13 
it follows that the c-mixed extension of a symmetric matrix game A 
is fair(see I.I.I6) if ν (A) exists. 
Contrary to the finite case, for a symmetric »»«»-matrix game A, 
ν (A) does not alvays exist (see the Wald-game in III.2.1). 
ш œ 5.З Let A € M .We shall call A = [b. .]. , . ,, where 
»x» i,j 1=1 ,J = 1 
Ъ1,1 : = 0' Ъ1,2к
+
1 = -Ъ2к
+
1,1 : = - 1' Ъ1,2к = "4,1 : = 1 f 0 r e a C h 
к G IU and Ъ 2 к ) 2 1 = Ъ 2 к + 1 ) 2 1 + 1 := 0, Ъ 2 к ) 2 1 + 1 := а ^ , 
Ъ2к
+
1,21 :=-а1,к f o r e a c h к' 1 е Ш' 
the Gale-Kuhn-Tucker symmetrization of the matrix game A. 
It is easy to see that (A ) = -A for each A € M 
5.U THEOREM 
Let A e M such that ν (A) € (0,»). 
OOXOD С 
g 
Then the c-mixed extension of A is fair. Furthermore: 
(1) If ρ e Oj(A) and q. € 0^ (A), then 
(2+Vc(A))"1(vc(A),p1 ,q1,p2,q2)...) £ 0*(Α8) = O^^A8) where 
6 := (2+v (Α))"1ε (e > 0). 
с 
[0 T(A) and О (A) are the sets of e-optimal strategies of the 
c-mixed extension of Α.] 
(2) If r £ 0^(А8) and e := Σ r^.^, , then e = l г.. > 0, ν (А) = e"1r, , 
1 . „ ¿I"*" I .
 н
 ¿1 С I 
1=1 1=1 
f(r) := e'^^.r^,...) £ θ£(Α) and g(r) := e"1 (r3,r ,. .. ) £ O ^ U ) . 
(3) Oj(A) / Φ and O^ÍA) / Φ iff 0^(AS) ^  φ. 
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Proof: (a) Take an ε > 0, a ρ € 0 (A) and a q € Cr (A). Then for 
χ := (2+v
c
(A))" (v
c
(A),p1.q^Pg.qg,...) we have 
œ oc 
χ e S C , xASe^ = ( Σ q - Σ p . ) ( 2 + v
c
( A ) ) ' 1 = 0, 
i=1 i=1 
» 
хА
В
е* = (2+v (A))- 1 (v (A)- Σ a
v
 .q,)>(2+v (A))- 1 ( V (A)-V (Α)-ε)=-δ 
for each к € Ш, and 
œ 
^Чк+І = ( 2 + v
c
( A ) ) - 1 ( - v
c
( A ) + Σ p . a . ^ г + ^ А ) ) - 1 (-ν ( A ) + V C ( A ) - E )--6 
i=1 ' 
for each к e TN. So ν (As) > -(2+v (Ajp'e.and ν (As) <_ (2+v (A)У e 
for each E > 0. Hence v
c
(AS) = 0 and χ e 0*(Α8) = CL (A3). 
(b) Let г € Oj(As). Then rASe >_ 0 implies that 
OD OD e :=
 . \ r2i+1 ^  A r2i· 1=1 1=1 
From e.A e, = -1 < ν (A ) we conclude that e. Í 0 (A ), r. < 1 and 
Ш 
e > 0 . Nov r A S e = г - Σ а^ · Γ Ο ' Α Ι - 0 = ν ( A 3 ) f o r e a - c h k G ^ і 
J ' 
thus e Ag(r) < e" г . Since ν (А) > 0 and g ( r ) € S c we may conclude 
К ™~ 1 с 
t h a t ν (A) < e " 1 ^ , r . > 0 . T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t 1 € E T (A S ) <= G T ( A S ) . 
С
 —
 1 1 I I 
Ш CD 
So e1A
s
r
t
 = 0, Σ r^.^. - Σ r„. = 0. Therefore f(r) e S. 1 . , 2ι+1 . , 2ι 
ι=1 ι=1 
It follows from the formula 
00 
r s ( A )4+1 = -ri + .\ ai,kr2i i 0 
ι=1 
that f(r)Ae£ >_ e~1rl for each к e IK; ν (A) >_ e
-
^. . 
So v
c
(A) = е"^^ f(r) £ 0°(A) and g(r) € 0° (A). 
(c) Let ρ G 0^(A) = Π 0^(A) and q € 0° (A) = Π 0^ (A) (see 1.1.11), 
e>0 ε>0 
For each ε > 0 we have χ := (2+v
c
(A))~ (vc(A),p1,q1,p2,q2,...ÌZO^A5) 
— 1 s 
where δ := (2+v (Α)) ε. But then χ С 0 (A ) φ φ, and we have proved 
the implication to the right in (3). The inverse implication follows 
from (2). 11 
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5.5 REMARK 
With the aid of theorem III.5.M с) we may conclude that there exist 
symmetric "»«»-matrix games A vith ν (A) = 0 and with empty optimal 
strategy spaces. 
[Consider the Gale-Kuhn-Tucker symmetrization of the matrix game 
В := A+J, where A is the matrix game, introduced in III.2.3{b).] 
5.6 REMARK 
For an mx»-matrix game A (m € IN) with v(A) > 0 we define a related 
symmetric =°x«>-matrix game В = [Ъ. . ] . , . , where b. . = -Ъ. := 1 J
 1.J 1=1,0 = 1 1,0 0,1 
for each j e Hi , M l } , Ъ, . = -Ъ. . := -1 for each j > m+1 , 
m+1 1,0 J » 1 
b. . = -b. . := a. . . . for each i ε IN ,\{ 1} and each 
i,0 0,1 i-l.j-m-l m+1 
j € ΓΝ\ΙΝ .,, and b. . := 0 elsewhere. 
0
 m+1 i,j 
In a similar way as in 5·'* one can prove: 
(1) v
c
(B) = 0. 
(2) ρ € 0I(A), q € OJJÍA) imply 
(2+v(A))"'l(v(A),p1,...,pm,q1,(i2,...) € 0*(B) where 
δ := (2+ν(Α)Γ1ε. 
(3) If (т^г2,...) € 0°(B), then 
e-1(r2,...,rm+1) 6 Ο
τ
(Α),Β-\ν
α+2,τ^3,...) С O^ÍA) where 
m+1 
e := ΐ г.. 
i=2 1 
5.Î Let А € M .By the von Neumann syimnetrization of A we mean the 
о о 
symmetric two-person zero-sum game n(A) := <IN ,IN ,L> with 
L((i,o'),(i,,Ò,)) := a. .,-a . for each (i, j ),( i' ,j ' ) € IN2. [See 1
, J 1 ,0 
also 1.1 .11+.] 
Obviously, n(A) can be reduced to an ">x»-matrix game but for notational 
91 
reasons we shall not do so. 
Let M Ъе the collection of elements Ρ £ M with p. . > 0 for each 
p 
i,j б IN, p. . φ 0 for only finitely many couples (ijj) £ ΓΝ and 
ι > J 
г p. . = ι. 
(i.jKiM 2 1 , J 
Then <M,M,E> with 
E(P,Q) := Σ Ζ p. Л а -a .)q (Ρ,ΟΕΜ) 
(i,j)eiii2 (i',j')eni 2 ^ 0 1 , J 1 ,J 1 'J 
is called the c-mixed extension of n(A). 
5.8 THEOREM 
Let A be an »x^-matrix game for which the c-mixed extension has a 
finite value. 
Let <M,M,E> Ъе the c-mixed extension of n(A). Then: 
(1) v(M,M,E) = 0. 
(2) If ρ £ Oj(A) and q £ O ^ U ) , then [ p ^ ] " ^ J
= 1 £ 0
2e(M
s
M,E). 
(3) If X € Ο^(Μ,Μ,Ε), then p(x) = (p1(X),P2(X),...) £ 0^(Α) and 
q(X) = ((i1(X),q2(X),...) £ O^ÍA) where 
Ш OD 
ρ·(Χ) := Ζ χ. ., <ι.(Χ) := Σ Χ . . for each i,j £ IM. 
j = 1 ^ J i=1 ^ 
Proof: (a) For each k,l € ΓΝ let Ε, , £ M Ъе the matrix with a 
» к,1 »χ» 
1 in the (k,l)-th cell and a О elsewhere. Then E £ M. 
K,l 
Take a ρ £ 0 ^ ( A ) and a q £ 0^ (A). Let X := [ p . q · ] " . "_. £ M. Then 
***b¿ - ¿, .^.аЧд-Ч,^ • ¿,ΡΛ,ι - ¿ak,^j • 
= pAe^-e Aq1 > (vc(A)-e)-(vc(A)+e) = -2ε for each (k,l) £ IK2. 
So ν(Μ,Μ,Ε) >_ -2e for each ε > 0. Since <M,M,E> is a symmetric game, 
we may conclude that v(M,M,E) = 0. Furthermore, X £ 0 e(M,M,E). Thus 
we have proved (1) and (2). 
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(Ъ) Let X б Oj(M,M,E). Then for each (k,l) € IN2: 
eo œ 
E(X,Ekfl) >-ε, ^ ^ «i.j^i.l-Vj^- 6 
00 00 
Ζ Ζ χ. .a.>^ Ζ Ζ χ. .a.-ε, 
i=1 j=i 1»J 1» 1 i=i j=i 1'J K'J 
oo ce 
E p.(X) a i Σ q (X) t .-e, 
p(X)Ae^ > e^qU^-c, 
v(A) >_ inf p(X)Ae* >. sup e Aq(x)t-E >_ ν(Α)-ε. 
lera *" кета 
Hence 
inf p(x)Ae^ > ν(Α)-ε, p(X) € 0^(A) , 
хеш 
sup e.Aqix)1 < ν(Α)+ε, q(X) € 0^T(A). 
kein * II 
Thus we have proved (3). || 
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CHAPTER IV 
INFINITE BIMATRIX GAMES 
§ 1 . M i x e d e x t e n s i o n s o f s e m i - i n f i n i t e 
b i m a t r i x g a m e s 
1.1 In chapter I I we ignored for a s emi - i n f i n i t e matr ix game A those 
p r o b a b i l i t y vec to rs in S tha t gave e.Aq = œ for some row e.A of A. 
From an i n t u i t i v e point of view i t seemed "na tu r a l " t o do so . 
For an mx»>-bimatrix game (A,B) we can r e s t r i c t e . g . the mixed 
s t r a t egy space of player I I to 
S* := {q € S; e.Aq* e ( - « , » ] , e i Bq t e ( -» ,»] for each i e ІТ^} 
or t o 
S**:= {q 6 S; e^ .Aq Ç. [ - " , « ) , e.Bq1^ € ( -» ,»] for each i e IN } , 
and define the mixed extensions 
<Sm,S*,EA,EB>, <Sm,S**,EA,EB> 
in an obvious way. 
However, it does not seen "natural" to me to look at these mixed 
extensions because player II is (mainly) interested in the pay-offs 
e.Bq and not in the pay-offs e.Aq . 
Therefore we now decide to restrict our attention to c-mixed 
extensions of arbitrary bimatrix games, and to f-mixed extensions 
of bimatrix games (A,B) where A and В are one-sided bounded matrices. 
1.2 DEFINITION 
Let (A,B) be an mx<=-bimatrix (m £ IN). We s h a l l c a l l the two-person 
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game <Sm ,S ,E ,E_> w i t h E . i p . q ) := pAq and E B ( p , q ) := pBq f o r each 
(p,q.) € Sm χ S t h e c-mixed e x t e n s i o n of ( A , B ) . The s e t of ε - e q u i l i -
Ъ г і и т p o i n t s (ε > θ) of t h i s c-mixed e x t e n s i o n i s d e n o t e d Ъу Ε ( Α , Β ) . 
1.3 DEFINITION 
L e t (Α,Β) h e an m x ^ - b i m a t r i x (m € l ï ï ) such t h a t A and В a r e o n e ­
s i d e d h o u n d e d . Then Ъу t h e f-mixed e x t e n s i o n of (Α,Β) we mean t h e 
t w o - p e r s o n game <S ,S ,E ,E > w i t h E . ( p , q ) := pAq and 
EB(p><l) := pBq f o r e a c h ( p , q ) € Sm χ S. 
§ 2 . ( e - ) e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t s o f m i x e d e x t e n ­
s i o n s o f s e m i - i n f i n i t e h i m a t r i x g a m e s 
2 . 1 THEOREM 
Let (Α,Β) Ъе an mx«>-bimatrix (m e IN) and suppose that В is bounded. 
Then Εε(Α,Β) φ φ for each ε > 0. 
Proof: For each η € IN let (A ,B ) be the mxn-bimatrix with 
— — η η 
lm n TÍ ·= Гъ 1ш n 
i,j i=1,j = 1' η · i,jJi=1,j = r 
л _ Г тШ η 
A := [a. , ] . 
η 1,J 1 
For each η € IN take a pn 6 S and a q e S such that 
(1) (Pn,sn(qn)) € E(An,Bn). [See I.2.7·] 
Let с := 1 + sup {|b. .|; i e IM , j € Ш , 
ι, J m 
E := {i € IN ; (рП). > 0}for each η e IM. 
n m ι 
Take a subsequence n(1),n(2),n(3),··· of 1,2,3,... such that 
Ε ,
Ί N = E ,,, for each к e IN, and such that lim p
n
^ B ( q n ^ ) % and 
n(k) n(1) * 
, . n(k) . . ^ 
lim ρ e x i s t . 
τ 4. -w τ · n i k ) - / n ( k K t _ _ , , ~ . . n ( k )
 r
 „m 
L e t b := l i m ρ ' B ( q ) e IR and ρ := l i m ρ € S . 
к-*» к-х» 
I t i s obvious t h a t E := {i e IN ; ( ρ ) . > 0} c= E , , » . 
m i щ і ; 
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Because in viev of (1) 
., r^kht n(k)„, n(k),t
 л
 ^ . _ _, 
e.A(q ) £ ρ A(q ) for each ι € ΙΉ , 
and because 
р
п(к)
Аи
п(к))*= Σ (
Р
пМ).(еМгМ)Ь) 
І
€
Е
 і ^
 1 1 
nik) 
we may conclude that 
e 
./ n(k)..t n(k)., n(k)Nt „ . · ,- -r, 
.A(q. ) = ρ A(q. ) for each ι £ E 
=^
л
 Ч I - У п\Ч. I J-ui са.і.-іі χ t J J - f v N " 
But then 
, 0ч -s., n(k)4t г /-КЧ , ./ n(k)vt N n(k)., n(k)^t . . 
(2) pA(q ) = t (p).(e.A(q ) ) = ρ A(q ) for each 
ІЕЕ 
к e га. 
Let ε > 0. Take а к. € IH such that for each к £ {k0,k +1,...} 
(3) |р п ( к )в(а п ( к )) -ъ| < ie. 
(U) I I P ^ ^ - P I I , < ice"1. 
n(k
n
)
 E We shall prove that (p,q υ ) € Ε (Α,Β). 
For each ρ € S we have 
(5) pAU^o))* %«*>\^γ {2J 5A(q
n(k
o))t> 
Let q € S c . Choose а к € {к . k . + l , . . . } such t h a t q. = 0 for each 
j > n ( k ) . Then 
(6) рВ
а
 < р п { к
 +іе = Р
П ( к )
В
п ( к ) ( з п ( к ^ ) ) г + і е < 
( < > Р П ( к , В
п ( ь ) ( - п ( к ) ( « І п ( к , ) ) Ч і е - p a ( k ) B ( ^ k ) ) M e { 
¿ V ^ o W ^ b V í e Τ pB(qn(k0))4E. 
In view of (5) and (6) we may conclude t h a t 
( p . q 1 1 ^ ) £ Ee(A,B) / rf. | | 
2.2 REMARKS 
(1) The c-mixed extension of an mx^-bimatrix game (m £ IK) does not 
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satisfy the assumptions in the various equilibrium point theorems 
mentioned in 1.2.7. 
(2) It is obvious that the c-mixed extension of the 1x»-bimatrix 
geme 
(Α,Β) := [(1,1) (1,2) (1,3) . . . ] , 
where В is unbounded, has no £-equilibrium points. 
2.3 THEOREM 
Let (Α,Β) be an mx^-bimatrix (и € Ш ) . Suppose that A is one-sided 
bounded. Suppose that В is lower bounded and that sup b. . = » 
jera ^ 
for each i £ IH . 
m 
Then E(Sm,S,EA,EB) φ φ. 
Proof: For each i € IH take a q1 e S such that e.Btq1^ = » (see 
m ^ ι ^
 v
1 m · (Ъ) of the proof of II.3.3), and let q := m Σ q1. 
i=1 
Then e.Bq = » for each i 6 И (see (с) of the proof of II.3.3). 
(a) Suppose first that A is lover hounded. Then Aq 6 ((IR U W) 1 1 1) . 
If there exists an iA € IN with e. Aq = », then 
Λ
 0 И
 \ 
pAq < » = e. Aq for each ρ € S 
and 
e. Bq < » = e. Bq for each q É S; 
10 ~ 10 
hence (e. ,q) Ê E(Sra,S,E.,Ε). 
I 0 AB 
If e.Aq* < » for each i € IN , then k'a' € (гат) , and we can find 
a p e s such that pAa = max pAq . 
pesm 
So (p,q) £ E(Sm,S,E.,Ε^) in that case. 
(b) Suppose now that A is upper bounded. 
If e.Aq = -<° for each i 6 IN , then it is easy to see that 
ι ·^ m 
(p,q)e E(Sm,S,EA,EB) for each ρ 6 S
m
. 
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If Aq Φ (-""Ol . then we can take a ρ £ S m such that pAq. = max pAq 
m
 p€F 
where 
F := {ρ e S m ; p.=0 for each i С IM with e.Aq = -»}, 
ι 
,πι and then (p.q) € E(S ,S,E.,E_). I 
A tí 
53. M i x e d e x t e n s i o n s o f i n f i n i t e b i m a t r i x 
g a m e s 
3.1 DEFINITION 
Let (A,B) be an «x°°-bimatrix. We shall call the two-person game 
<SC,SC,E ,E > with E (p,q) := pAq1 and EB(p,q) := pBq for each 
A D Η 
(p,q) í Sc x S the c-mixed extension of the bimatrix game (A,B). 
The set of e-equilibrium points (ε > θ) of such a game is denoted 
by Ee(A,B). 
3.2 Of course there are <»x«>-bimatrix games (А,В) for ¥hich E (А,В) = i 
for some ε > 0. Take e.g. (A,-A), where A is the »xoMnatrix of 
III.2.1. Then Se(A) = Εε(Α,-Α) = (¡i if ε = ^  (see 1.1.6). 
3.3 DEFINITION 
We shall say that an »»«»-bimatrix game (A,B) is weakly finite for 
player I if for each ε > 0 there exists a finite subset F of IN such 
that {e.A; i £ F} e-dominates each element of {e.A; i £ IN}. 
3.^ The following theorem can be seen as a generalization to infinite 
bimatrix games of theorem III.3.7. 
THEOREM 
Let (A,B) be an infinite bimatrix game with a bounded matrix B, 
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which is weakly finite for player I. Then E (А,В) ^ φ for each e > 0. 
Proof: Let ε > 0. Take a finite subset F с IK such that {e.A; i e F} 
je-dominates each element of {e.A; i € IN}. We suppose w.l.o.g. that 
F = IM . 
m 
From IV.2.1 we know that there exists a (p,5) € ESE'(A ,B ). 
m»· m,00 
[A and В are the mx^-matrices consisting of the first m rows 
m,
00
 m,°> 
of A and В.] We shall prove that (a (p),5) £ Ε (А,В). In a similar 
way as in the proof of III.3.7 we can derive that for each ρ G S 
there is a ρ £ S with s (ρ) £ S such that 
m 
s (p)A > pA-5e1 · 
m " m,» —
 ш 
So 
sup pAq. < sup pA 3 +5ε < pA δ +ε = a (p)Aâ +e 
pes0 - pes"1 ^ - m*" 
and it is obvious that for each q. £ S : 
a (p)Bq = pB q < pB 3 +5ε = a (ρ)Βά +5ε. 
m * ^ * m,™^ —
 r
 m," m * ^ 
Therefore (a (p),q) € Ee(A,B). || 
3.5 THEOREM 
Let (A,B) be an »»«»-bimatrix with an upper bounded pay-off matrix 
A and a lower bounded В for which sup b. . = => for each i € IN. 
jera ^ 
Then the f-mixed extension of (A,B) has 8-equilibrium points for 
each ε > 0. 
Proof: Take a q e S such that e.Bq* = » for each i e IN. Let ρ € S 
be such that pAq1 >_ sup pAq -ε. Then (p,q) 6 Εε(Ξ,3,Ε ,E ). || 
p€S A B 
3.6 The effect of perturbations of the pay-offs of infinite bimatrix 
games on the 8-equilibri\jm points is described in the following 
THEOREM 
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Let e and 6 Ъе positive real numbers. Let Α,Β,Α',B' € M such 
that dU.A') < 6 and dtB.B' ) < δ. Then Εε(Α,Β) с E ^ ^ U ' ,Β' ). 
[dU.A') := sup {|a. .-a! .|; i e ІИ, j £ IH}.] 
Proof: Let (p,q.) £ Ee(A,B). For each ρ e S c, q € Sc: 
pA'q* £ рАд +6 <_ ρΑ^+ε+δ <_ рА'^+с+гб, 
pB*^ <_ рВдг+5 <_ pBq +ε+δ <_ f¡B,^t+c+2&. 
So (p,q) € Ee+26(A',B'). || 
3.7 THEOREM 
Let d Ъе the "metric" on Μ χ M defined Ъу 
αοχαο ooxoD 
d ^ U . B M A ' . B · ) ) := max {d(A,A' ) ,d(B,B· )} 
for a l l ( Α , Β Μ Α ' , Β ' ) e Н ^ χ К . 
ООХШ » X OD 
Let W := {(A,В) € М ^ x M^^; Ee(A,B) φ φ for each e > 0}. 
Then W is a closed subset of <M * M ,d*>. 
COX» «exoo ' 
* * _ 
Proof: Let (A ,B ) £ W and let ε > 0. Then there is an (A,B) £ W 
such that d(A,A ) < ¿ε and d(B,B ) < ίε- Take a (p.q) £ E^e(A,B) + φ. 
It follows from IV.3.6 that (p,q) £ EE(A ,B ) Φ <¡>. So (Α*,Β ) £ W. | | 
3.Θ In the following theorem we shall look at the von Neumann symmetri-
zation of an infinite Ъіта^іх game. 
THEOREM 
Let (A.B) be an »x^-himatrix. Let M be the subset of probability 
2 
measures on IN defined in 111.5.7· 
Let L1 : Μ χ M ->• IR and L 2 : Μ χ M ->• IB be defined by 
L (P,Q) := Ζ Σ ρ .(a. +b .)q k l, L (P,Q) :=L(Q,P). 
1
 (i,j)£nj2 (k,l)£IH2 1' J 1* 1 k , J 1C-L 2 1 
[ p
= tPi,j]I=i,]=i'Q=Ui,J]î=i,J=ieM-] 
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(1) Let (p,<i) б Ee(A,B) and X := [p.q·]".. "!_ . Then 
1 J 1—1 s J "~ I 
(x,x) e E 2 E ( M , M , L 1 , L 2 ) . 
(2) Let (X,X) С EE:(M,M,L1,L2). Then (p(X),q(X))e E
E(A,B) (where 
p(X) and q(X) are defined as in III.5.8). 
Proof: (1) Let К be the element of M described in III.5.θ 
(k,l € IN). 
For each k.,1 e IH we have 
L^Ej^ ^X) = ejA^+pBe* <. (pAq^eí+ípB^+e ) = L}(X,X)+2z 
and also 
L2(X,Ek ^ <_ L2(X,X)+2e. 
Hence (X,X) £ E2e(M,M,L1,L2). 
(2) (X,X) € Ee(M,M,L1,L2) implies that 
L1(Ek,l,X) - Li(x'x)+e> 
L2(X,Ek 1) < L2(X,X)+e for each (k,l) € IH2. 
о 
So for each (k,l) £ IN we have 
е
к
А
Ч
(Х) +
р
(х)Ве* < р(Х)А(і(х)Ч
р
(х)Вд(Х)Че. 
From this last inequality we may conclude: 
ek' . AqiX)* <_ р(Х)Ао.(х)Ч е for each к e IN, 
p(X)Be£ < pCxÎBqiXÎ^e for each 1 € IN. 
Hence (p(X),q(X)) e Ε ε (Α,Β). | | 
§1*. M o r e г - е д и і 1 і Ъ г і и т p o i n t t h e o r e m s 
U.I Let <X,Y,K1,K„> be a two-person game with r e a l - v a l u e d pay-off 
f u n c t i o n s . For each χ £ X (y £ Y) l e t us denote by e (e ) t h e 
χ y 
probability measure with mass 1 in χ (y). Let Ρ (χ) be the convex 
hull of {e ; χ £ X} and let PC(Y) := ch {e ; y £ Y}. 
x y 
ιοί 
The two-person game <PC(X),PC(Y),E ,E > with 
Ε^υ,ν) := ƒƒ K^x.y) dp(x) dv(y), 
Е2(у^) := SI K2(x,y) dy(x) dv(y) for each (u,v) € PC(X)xPC(Y) 
is called the c-mixed extension of the game <X,Y,K1,K2>. 
k.2 THEOREM 
Let m € IM. Let <ΓΝ ,Y,K1,K.> Ъе a two-person game with a real-
valued pay-off function K. and a hounded pay-off function K«. Then 
the c-mixed extension of <ΓΝ ,Υ,Κ.,Kp> has ε-equiiihrium points for 
each e > 0. 
The preceding theorem is a generalization of theorem IV.2.1. One 
can prove it Ъу slightly modifying the proof of IV.2.1. 
[In the proof of· IV.2.1 we took a suitable subsequence of the 
sequence {(p >l·); η € IN}, where (p ,q ) corresponded to an equi-
librium point of the mixed extension of the finite subgame (A ,B ) 
of (A,B). Now take a suitable subnet of the net {(p.,q.); A € F}, 
where F is the family of finite subsets of Y directed by =>, and 
where (p-.q.) corresponds to an equilibrium point of the mixed 
extension of the finite subgame <Ш ,Α,Κ. ,K0> of the game 
m ι ^ 
<raDi,Y,K1,K2>.] 
1*.3 THEOREM 
Let <X,Y,K1,K > be a two-person game with real-valued pay-off 
functions and suppose that K. is bounded. For each y € Y let the 
function f : X ->• IR be defined by f (χ) := КЛх.у) (χ e Χ). Sup­
pose that there exists a metric d on X such that 
(l) <X,d> is a precompact metric space, 
102 
(2) {f ; y £ Y} is an equicontinuous family of functions on <X,d>. 
Then EE(PC(X),PC(Y),E1,E2) Φ fi for each E > 0. 
Proof: Take an ε > 0. Then there exists a δ > 0 such that for each 
y € Y and each x',x" € X with d(x',x") < 6 : |κ
ι
(χ',y)-K1(x",y)| < ίε. 
Since X is precompact, we can find an m £ IN and χ,,Xp,...,x € X 
m 
such that U {χ € X; d(x,x.) < 6} = X. 
i=1 1 
In view of IV.U.2 we can find an ^-equilibrium point (μ,ν) of the 
c-mixed extension of the game <{x1,x_ χ })Y,K1,K_>. Then 
(1) Ε1(βχ ,0) <. Е^р.О+ге for each i e П^, 
i 
(2) E2(ij,e ) < Ε2(μ,0) + 5ε for each у e Y. 
We shall prove that (μ,ν) € EE(PC(X),PC(Y),E1,E ). In view of (2) 
it is sufficient to show that 
ЕЛе ,ν) <_ ЕЛ .О+е for each χ € X. 
Taie an χ € X. There is an i € ΓΝ such that d(x,x.) < δ, and then 
K^x.y) < K1(xi,y)+se for each y € Y. 
Therefore 
(1) 
E1(ex,v) < E1(ex ,0)+ie < Ε^μ,Ο+ε. || 
i 
k.h COROLLARY 
Let <X,Y,K1,K2> he a two-person game with real-valued pay-off 
functions. 
Let X Ъе a precompact metric space, Y a metric space, K. : Χ χ Y -»• 
a uniformly continuous function and Kp : Χ χ Y -»• IE a bounded 
function. Then the c-mixed extension of <X,Y,K1,Kp> has e-equili-
Ъгіит points for each e > 0. 
U.5 DEFINITION 
Let <X,Y,K.,K?> be a two-person game. We shall call the pair (Κ.,Κ«) 
103 
IB 
a concave-affine, affine-concave-like pair of functions if 
(1) for each χ. ,x„ ε X and each t 6 (0,1) there is an χ € X such 
that K^XQ.y) > tK^x^yMl-t^Ug.y) and 
K2(x0,y) = tK2(x.vy) + (i-t)K2(x2,y) for each y € Y, 
(2) for each y ,y e Y and each t € (0,1) there is a y £ Y such 
that K1(x,y0) = tlC^x.y Ж і - Ж^х.у^ and 
К2Ы,У0)?.ЬК.2Ы,у^+(-\-г)К2(х,у2) for each χ £ X. 
[Two-person zero-sum games with a concave-convex-like pay-off 
function were studied by K. Fan in [lit] and N.J. Young looked at 
two-person zero-sum games with a "bi-affine-like pay-off function in 
[бй] p.738.] 
h.6 REMAHK 
If X and Y are convex subsets of linear spaces, then for each con­
cave-af f ine К. : X x Y-»- IR (i.e. χ •-»•Κ. (χ,у) is a concave func­
tion on X for each у € Y, and y-»- K„(x,y) is an affine function on 
Y for each χ £ X), and each affine-concave K2 : Χ χ Y + IE, 
(K-plO is a concave-af f ine, affine-concave-like pair of functions. 
U.T THEOREM 
Let <X,Y,K1,K2
>
 be a two-person game with the same properties as 
the game in theorem IV.U.S. Suppose furthermore that (Κ ,Κ.) is a 
concave-affine, affine-concave-like pair of functions. 
Then Ee(X,Y,K1,K2) í i for each ε > 0. 
Proof: Take an ε > 0. Then we can find a (y,v)€ Ee(Pc(x),PC(Y),E1,E ), 
m 
[See IV.U.3.] μ is of the form Σ p.e and ν of the form 
. , i x. 
η 1=1 1 
Σ д.e , where (p..,...,ρ ) £ Sm, χ. £ X for each i £ IH , 
j=1 Λ yj 
IO!* 
(q.,...,q ) e S and y. £ Y for each j € IN . So we have for each 
ι η j η 
χ e x, y e Y: 
η m η 
(1) Σ q.K (x,y.) < Σ Σ p.q Κ (χ ,y·)+e, 
j=1 J ' J i=i j=i J J 
m m η 
(2) Ζ p iK 2(x i,y) < Σ Ζ Pi<ljK2(xi,y.)+e. 
i=1 i=1 j=1 
Since (Κ-,Κρ) is a concave-affine, affine-concave-like pair of 
functions, we can find an X- € X and a yn € Y such that for each 
χ € X and each y € Y: 
m m 
(3) K1(x0,y) > Σ р
і
К 1(х і,у), К2(х0,у) = Σ р Л С ^ . у ) , 
і=1 і=1 
η η 
(It) K^x.yQ) = Σ (ijK^x.Yj), K2(x,y0) > Σ дЖ 2(х,у^). 
Then 
(k) η (Dm η (3) 
(5) Κ (x,y
n
) = Σ q.K (x,y.) <_ Σ Σ p. q Κ (χ. ,y. )+ε < 
j = 1 J •J i=1 j = 1 J J 
(1*) 
- .
Σ
 '
1j Ki ( xo , yj ) + e = Ki ( xo , yo ) + e· 
In an analogous manner we infer from (3), (2), (U) and (3): 
(6) K2(x0,y) £ K 2(x 0,y 0)+ e. 
In view of (5) and (6) we may conclude that (x0,y0) € Ee(X,Y,K1,K2) 
h.8 The folioving theorem generalizes a result of S. Karlin concerning 
zero-sum games on the unit square, [cf [8] p.113, [26] and [5**].] 
THEOREM 
Let φ : [0,1) -*• [0,°=) Ъе a strictly increasing continuous function. 
Let 
ф(1) := lim ф(х) € [0,-], 
:= {(x,y) € IR¿; χ e [0,1], у e [0,ф(х))}, 
'1 
= {(x,y) e ΙΕ2; χ e [0,1], у > ф(х)}, 
= {(χ,φ(χ)) € IH2; χ € [0,1], φ(χ) € IR}, 
105 
and let D := С , D := CL. Let M and M „ be real-valued func­
tions on D., M.
 1 and M1 „ bounded uniformly continuous functions 
on D, and M 0 , and M0 „ bounded uniformly continuous functions on 
D, such that 
<*>
 M2,2 ^  M0,2 1 M1 ,2 0 n D0 u n d M2,1 i M0,1 i M1 ,1 0 П ^ 1 
For i € {1,2}, let К. : [0,1] χ [θ,-) -»· IE Ъе defined by 
f М1Д(х,у) if (x.y) € C1 
^(x.y) := / M0 i(x,y) if (x.y) £ D0 
( м 2 i(x,y) if (x.y) e c2. 
Then there exist £-equilibrium points for the c-mixed extension of 
<tO,l],[0,»),K1tK2> for each ε > 0. 
Proof: Let ε > 0. Take an m € IN such that for each s € {1,2} and 
each t £ {1,2}: 
|Me .(x,y)-Me .(χ1,y')I < e for each (x,y).(x'.y') € ϋ= with 
I I (x,y)-(x' .y' ) I !_ <_ m" . Let (A,B) be the (m+1 )x»-bimatrix 
[(K^inf ,jm~ ),K2(im" ,jm" ))'li=0 • 0 · 
In view of IV.2.1 there exist a ρ = {p0,p1 ,...,p J t S and a 
q = (%tii>• ··) e s C s u c h t h a t (p.i) e Εε(Α,Β). 
m β
0 
Let μ := Σ Pieim-1
 e
 PC([0
>
1]) and С := Σ Ч.е^.і € РС([0,»)). 
We shall prove that 
(1) E2(iJ,e ) <_ Ε2(μ,ν)+3ε for each у С [θ,»). 
If у = jm~ for some j G IH U {0}, then 
m
 l i t t (**) E2(5,e ) = Σ p.K (im .jm ) = pBe. < pBq +ε = Ε (μ,ν)+ε. 
* i=o J 
If у e (km~ ,(k+l)m~ ) for some к € IN U {0}, then we distinguish 
three cases. 
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I. If (ш"1,кт"1) € С and (im_1,y) 6 С (s € {1,2}), then 
s s 
K2(im~ ,y)-K2(im ,кпГ ) = M s 2(im
-
 ,y)-M
 2(im
_
 ,km~ ) < e. 
II. If (im-1,km-1) € D0, then 
K2(im~ ,y)-K2(im" ,km" ) = M2 2(im" ,y)-M0 2(im" ,km" ) < 
W -1 -1 -i' 
^ M2 2(im ,y)-M 2(im ,km ) < ε. 
If (im ,y) € ϋ
η
, then, analogously, we have 
K2(im" ,y)-K2(im" ,km~ ) < ε. 
III. If (im- ,y) € С and (im~ ,km~ ) £ C., then there is a 
y0 6 (km- ,y) such that (im ,yQ) € DQ; and then 
K2(im~ ,y)-K2(im" ,km ) = (M 2(im~ >y)-M0 2(im~ ,У0)) + 
' ΐ * ì ' 
+ (M0t2(im"1,y0)-M1j2(ijn"1,km"1)) < (M2 2(im"1,y)-M2
 2 ( Μ "
Ί
,
Υ Ο
) ) Η 
+ (M1)2(im"
1
,y0)-Mlj2(im"
1
,km"1)) < 2
ε
. 
But then 
m
 -1 -1 -1 
E2(C,ey)-E2(î,ekjii_i) = ς p^K^im ,y)-K2(im .km )) < 2e; 
E2(iJ,ey) < E2(C,ekm_1)+2e <_ Ε2(μ,ν)+3ε. 
In a similar manner one can prove that 
(2) Ε1(εχ,ν) <. Ε^μ,Ο+Βε for each χ ζ [0,1] . 
In view of (1) and (2), we may conclude that (μ,ν) is a Зг-едиі-
librium point of the c-mixed extension of <[0,1 ] ,[0,°°) ,Κ. ,K„> . || 
h.9 REMABKS 
(a) If one modifies the inequalities in (*) of theorem IV.k.θ in an 
otvious way (there still are three possibilities), then the 
conclusion of the theorem remains true. 
(b) In theorem IV.h.8 the pay-off functions may have discontinuities 
along one curve in [0,1] χ [0,«°). If one presupposes discon-
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tinuities along a finite number of curves, which have positive dis-
tances to each other, and one modifies (*) in an obvious way, then 
the conclusion of the theorem remains also true. 
(c) In the zero-sum version of theorem IV.It.8 (M. = -M. for each 
1 ,£1 1 , 1 
i £ {0,1,2}), the assumptions can Ъе weakened. 
U.10 From IV.U.3 we infer 
THEOREM 
Let <[0,1 ] , [0,«°) ,Κ- ,K-> he a two-person game such that K. is real-
valued and K„ is bounded and suppose that {f ; y € [0,»)} is an 
equicontinuous family of functions on [0,1] (See IV.U.3, for the 
definition of f ). Then there exist c-equilibrium points for the 
c-mixed extension of this game for each ε > 0. 
This result is a generalization of a theorem of J. Ville [53], 
which asserts that the mixed extension of a zero-sum game on the 
unit square <[0,1],[0,1],K> with a continuous pay-off function has 
a value (and optimal mixed strategies if all probability measures 
on the Borei sets of [0,1] are admitted as mixed strategies). [See 
also [18].] 
Ц.11 THEOREM 
Let <[0,1 ] ,[0,·») ,K> be a two-person zero-sum game for which К is 
continuous. Let P. be the family of all probability measures on 
the Borei sets of [0,1] and Ρ := ch{e ; у e [θ,»)}. Then the 
mixed extension <P1 ,P ,E> of <[0,1 ] ,[0,">) ,K>, in which 
CO OD 
Ε(μ,ν) := Σ q. /K(x,y.)άμ(χ) for each μ e Ρ, ν = Σ q.e £ Р^, 
j=1 J J j=1 J yj 
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has a value and Ο (Ρ ,Ρ^,Ε) / <¡S. 
Proof: For each η С IN, look at the suhgame <[0,1],[θ,η],K> of 
<[0,1] ,[0,<»),K>. Let Ρ Ъе the family of all probability measures 
on the Borei sets of [0,n] ела Pc := ch{e ; у € [0,n]}. 
η у 
From an obvious variant of Ville's Theorem it follows that 
<P1,Ρ ,Έ> has a value and that both players have optimal strategies. 
Let ν £ 0 (P.,Ρ ,E). Since К : [0,1] χ [Ο,η] •+• IR is a uniformly 
•ν с 
continuous function, for each e > 0 there exists a ν € Ρ such that 
"x 
So 
E(e ,v) <_ E(e ,ν)+ε for each χ € [0,1] , 
v(P.,,PC,E) < v(P.,,P ,E)+e for each e > 0. i n — i n 
Furthermore, 
νίΡ.,Ρ^Ε) = sup inf Ε(μ,βJ = νίΡ.,Ρ ,E). 
-
 1 n
 yep, y€[o,n] y 1 n 
Hence νίΡ,^,Ε) exists and Ο^ ,ίΡ, ,Ρ^,Ε) = Ο^Ρ,,Ρ^Ε) φ i. 
For each η e IM, take a p e O T(P.,P
C
,E). By Helly's Theorem there 
n l i n 
exists a subsequence of ρ-,Ρρ,... which converges weakly to a 
probability measure ρ e Ρ-. 
Now, in a similar way as in II.2.2, one can prove that 
D C
 ^ - lim --'" - c ^ — ' ^—^ * *
 n
 tv
 Ώ
= 
η-Μβ 
νΐΡ,,Ρ^,Ε) = lim νίΡ,,Ρ^,Ε) and that ¡à € Ο^Ρ,,Ρ^,Ε). | 
lt. 12 DEFINITION 
Let meiN. Let <[θ,1 ] ,[0,»>) ,K> be a two-person zero-sum game with 
a pay-off function К which is of the form 
m 
K(x,y) = Σ f.(x)g-(y) for each (x,y) e [0,l]x[0,=), 
i=1 
where f. : [0,1] -»• IB and g. : [0,») •* IB are continuous functions 
for each i € IN . Then we shall call such a game a separable game 
over [0,1]x[0,»). [Cf [11],[35] Ch.11.] 
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1*.13 THEOREM 
Let <[0,1 ] ДО,») ,K> be a separable game with К as in VI.U.12. 
Then there exist x..,x2,...,x € [0,1] and a ρ ε S such that 
Л
р
і
е
х. εοίΡ,,ρ^,Ε). 
ι=1 ι 
[For the definition of P1 ,Ρρ
 a n d E
»
 s e e
 IV.U.U.] 
Proof: Let φ : P. -»• IRm be defined by 
φ(μ) := (/f1(x)dp(x),/f2(x)dw(x),...,/fm(x)dy(x)) for each μ Ê F.,. 
With the aid of Helly's Theorem and a separating hyperplane theorem, 
one can prove that φίΡ.) is a compact convex subset of IR and that 
φ(Ρ..) is the convex hull of the connected set {ф(е ); χ € [0,1]}. 
[See [35] theorems 11.1* and 11.5.] Furthermore, if μ e Ρ , 
y £ OjÍP.j.Pg.E) and φ(μ) = φ(μ), then μ £ Ο ^ Ρ ^ , Ε ) . 
Take a i e ОЛР ,Ρ^,Ε) (^ ¿ by I V . U . I I ) . Then, by a s t rong vers ion 
of Caratheodory 's Theorem (see [26] p .358 , lemma B . 2 . 2 ) , t h e r e 
ex i s t x . . , X p , . . . , x e [0 ,1] and a ρ e S such t h a t 
m m 
φ(μ) = ΐ Р і Ф ( е
х
 ) · Hence φ(μ) = φ( Σ ρ
ί
ε
χ
 ) ; 
i=1 i i=1 i 
Λ Piex. € 0 (Ρ,,Ρ^,Ε). И 
1=1 1 
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CHAPTER V 
MATRIX GAMES OVER A SUBFIELD OF THE REAL NUMBER FIELD 
§ 1 . F i n i t e m a t r i x g a m e s o v e r к 
1.1 In the following к is always a subfield of IR. 
A subset С of km (m € Ш ) is called convex if tc +(l-t)c € С for 
each t £ (0,1) Π к and each с, ,c~ € С. The set of extreme points of 
a convex set С с к is denoted Ъу ext, (С). 
1.2 A matrix game over к is a matrix game [a. .]· , · . (m,n 6 IN) for 
a
 i,J i=1 ,j = 1 
which a. . € к for each i £ Л! and each j e IN . i,j m η 
1.3 Let А Ъе an mxn-matrix game over к (m,η € IM). 
The k-mixed extension of A is the two-person zero-sum game 
<Sm(k),Sn(k),E >, with 
m 
Sm(k) := i(p1,p2,...,pm) e km;pi > 0 for each i £ IKm, Σ p i = 1}, 
i=1 
Sn(k) := {(q-.qp a) € kn;q, ^  0 for each j € IN , E q. = 1}, 
EA(p,q) := pAq* for each ρ € Sm(k) and each q £ Sn(k). 
1.1* Instead of 0I(Sm(k) ,Sn(k) .Ед) and 0II(S
m(k) ,Sn(k) .Ед) we shall write 
OjU.k) and 0II(A,k). 
Note that a finite matrix game over к can also he seen as a matrix 
game over IR, and that 0 (A) = 0 (A,IR) and 0 (A) = 0 (A,IR). 
1.5 From (1) of the following theorem, which will be proved with the aid 
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of Shapley-Snow's Theorem for real finite matrix games (see 1.2.8), 
ve may conclude that the k-mixed extensions of finite matrix games 
over к have saddle-points. This is a well-known fact: 
(1) H. Weyl proved it in [62] (also for non-archimedean ordered 
fields) with tools developed in [61]. 
(2) D. Gale, H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker proved it in [l6] using a 
lemma of E. Stiemke. 
(3) E. Marchi proved it in [З^] р.23б with the aid of an elimination 
process. 
From (2) of the following theorem we may conclude that the optimal 
strategy spaces of the k-mixed extension of an mxn-matrix game over 
к are convex sets in к and к respectively. 
From (З) of the theorem below a method can be derived for the cal­
culation of all extreme points of 0 (A,k) and 0 (A,k) by looking 
at the square submatrices of A. [See 1.2.8 and [1*7].] 
THEOREM 
Let m,m 6 IN. Let A be an mxn-matrix game over k. Then: 
(1) max min E (p,q) and min max E»(p>4) exist and 
pesm(k) qesn(k) A qesn(k) pesm(k) A 
are equal. 
(2) OjU.k) = OjU.IR) Π кт, O^U.k) = 0
ΙΙ
(Α,ΙΗ) Π кП. 
(3) extk(0I(A,k)) = ext(0I(A,IR)), extj^OjjU.k)) = extCO^A.IB) ). 
Proof: (a) Let ν be the value of the IR-mixed extension of A. 
Then from Shapley-Snow's theorem (see 1.2.8) we infer: 
ν e к, extíOjU.IE)) <= кт, and ext (О (A,IR)) с к11. 
(Ъ) Take a ρ* Ê extíO^A.IE) ) and a q* € ext(O (A,IR) ) . Then 
EA(p*,q*) = ν and 
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EA(p*»q) 1 ν for each q 6 S
n(k)(c S n), 
EA(P»<1*) 1 ν for each ρ € Sm(k)(c S™). 
So, in view of 1.1.10, we have 
majt_ inf E (p,q) =
 m i n SUp E.(p,q) = ν € к. 
резЛк) qesn(k) A qesn(k) pesm(k) 
Now (1) follows from 
inf E (p,q) = min E (ρ,e.) = min E (p,q), 
qesn(k) A jeiu
n
 A J
 qesn(k) A 
SUPT„ ЕД(Р»Ч) = max E (e.,q) = max E (p,q). 
p€sm(k) A іеш
т
 A 1
 pesm(k) A 
(e) In (b) we have implicitly proved that 
extCOjU.IR) с 0 (A,k) and ext(0II(A,rE) ) с 0 (A,k). 
But then 
Oj-U.IR) Π km с 0I(A,k) and 0 (Α,ΙΗ) П к11 с 0 (A,k). 
(d) Let ρ € 0T(A,k). Then Ε. (ρ,e.) > ν for each j Ç. IN . Hence 
J- л j η 
E.(p,q) = Σ q.E (p.e.) > ν for each q e S n; ρ ε 0
Т
(А,ІВ). 
J-* 
So we have proved that О (A,k) с 0 (A,IR) П km. 
In a similar way it follows that 0
т:і
.(А,к) с 0 (Α,ΙΗ) Π к . 
Therefore (2) is valid. 
(e) In view of (2) and (c) it is ohvious that ext(0 (Α,ΙΕ)) С 
extk(0I(A,k)). 
We shall now prove that ext. (0 (A,k)) <= ext(0 (Α,ΙΗ)). 
л 1 I 
Suppose that f.,f„,...,f are the extreme points of 0T(A,IB). 
Let χ € О (А,к), χ g ext(0 (Α,ΙΗ)). Then there is a 
u 
ν = (v.,v- ν ) € S such that χ = Σ v.f. and such that at least 
i=1 
two coordinates of ν axe unequal to zero. But then there exists also 
u 
a w = (w1,w2,...,w ) € S (к) such that χ = Σ w.f., and at least two 
i=1 
coordinates of w are unequal to zero. 
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Thus χ g ext(О (А,к));ext (О (А,к)) с ext(0 (А.ГН)), and the first 
Χ κ χ χ 
equality in (3) is proved. 
In a similar manner we can prove the second equality in (3). || 
1.6 REMARK 
A generalization of Shapley-Snow's theorem to finite bimatrix games 
was given by N.N. Vorob'ev [55]· [See also [30].] 
From this generalization one can derive that for each finite mxn-
bimatrix game over a subfield к of IR, the k-mixed extension has an 
equilibrium point in к χ к . The proof of this statement is left 
to the reader. 
1.7 REMARK 
A two-person zero-sum game in extensive form in the sense of Kuhn 
[29], without chance moves, where the range of the pay-off function 
is a subset of {1,-1,0}, reduces to a finite matrix game with 
elements of {1,-1,0} in the cells. [If for a win-lose-draw game 
without chance moves we denote win, lose, draw by 1,-1,0, respec­
tively, then we are in this situation.] 
It follows from theorem V.l.5 that the mixed extension of such a 
game has a rational value. 
§2. I n f i n i t e m a t r i x g a m e s o v e r к 
2.1 THEOREM 
Let A € M (me Ш ) such that c(A) < ». Let к be a subfield of IB 
mxoo 
and suppose that a. · € к for each i £ IH , л € IB. 
ι,Ο m 
Then v(A) € к and 0° (А) П Sc(k) φ i, where 
111* 
ем0 
2χ« 
SC(k) := {q e S c; q. e к for each j e Hf}. 
J 
Proof: Take an η € Hi, η > c(A) and let A := [a. . ] . ._ . 
Then, by theorem V.l.5, v(A) = v(A ) 6 к and 0 (A
n
) Π kn φ φ. 
Take a q € 0 (A ) П kn. Then a
n
(q) e O^ÍA) П Sc(k). || 
2.2 EXAMPLES 
(a) Let s.jSp,... be a decreasing sequence of rational numbers with 
lim s. = І-^З, and t.jt,,... a decreasing sequence of rational 
i-*" ГО 1 -1 1 -1 1 . . ? 
numbers with lim t. = /2-1'. Let A : = 
i~ 1 L 0 s1 1 s2 2
 S3··· 
Then A is a matrix game over Q. It can be shown that v(A) = 0, 
0I(A) = {(l-i/2,i/2)} and O^ÍA) = {e,} с SC(k). 
Hence О (А) П Q = φ. [See theorem V.2.3 and note that 
ПЯЧЕНА) = {2,3,1+,...}.] 
(b) Let u.tu-,... be a decreasing sequence of rational numbers such 
that lim u. = /2. Then the 1x»-matrix game 
h u2 u3 ··· ] 
over Q has no value in Q. [ν(Α,ΓΡ) = /2, c(A) = =>.] 
2.3 THEOREM 
Let A 6 M (me IN) such that C(A) < «, and suppose that IN\ETT(A) mx™ ll 
is a finite set. Let к be a subfield of IH and suppose that a. . € к 
1
 >J 
for each i € Ш , j € IN. Then 
m 
v(A) e к, 0I(A) Π k
m
 φ φ and OjjU) П Sc(k) / φ. 
Proof: In view of V.2.1 we have only to prove that 0 (Α) Π km Φ φ. 
From the proof of IIΛ. 8 we know that there is an η e IN such that 
0T(A) = 0T(JU). Hence 0T(A) П k
m
 = 0T(A_) П k
m
 φ φ by theorem V.l.5. 
- L i n I I n 
115 
2Λ The proof of the following theorem is left to the reader. 
THEOREM 
Let A £ M such that ν (A) exists and C T(A) < «, cTT(A) < ~. 
«Xeo С X XI 
Suppose that a. . € к for each i,j € IN, where к is a subfield of 
1 в J 
IR. Then v
c
(A) 6 k. If, moreover, IM\E (A) (IH\E (A)) is a finite 
set, then 0 (Α) Π Sc(k) φ φ (θ (А) П Sc(k) / {(). 
2.5 EXAMPLE 
Let A € M Ъе the diagonal game (see 111.2.11) with a. . := 0 if 
-х- - е е
 1 ) J 
.2 i 5Е j and a. . := i for each i € ΓΝ. 
ι »ι 
Then A is a matrix game over Q. But ν.(Α) = 6n £ Q and 
Oj(A) = i-gd,!*"1^"1,...)}. Thus of(A) Π SC(Q) = rf. 
π 
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SAMENVATTING 
In dit proefschrift worden verscheidene gemengde uitbreidingen van half-
oneindige en oneindige matrix- en bimatrixspelen ingevoerd (II.1, III. 1, 
IV.1, IV.3, V) en bestudeerd. 
Voor gemengde uitbreidingen van matrixspelen vindt een onderzoek plaats 
naar de existentie van een waarde en van optimale strategieën (II.2, 
II.3, III.2, III.3). Voldoende voorwaarden voor de existentie van ε-
evenwichtspunten van gemengde uitbreidingen van bimatrixspelen komen 
aan de orde in IV.2 en IV.3 terwijl in IV.U e-evenwichtspuntstellingen 
bewezen worden voor meer algemene niet-cooperatieve tweepersoonsspelen. 
Voor gemengde uitbreidingen van matrixspelen, welke een waarde bezitten, 
volgt een onderzoek naar de struktuur van de optimale strategieenruim­
ten (II.3, II.lt, II.5, III.lt). 
II.5, III.lt.5 en III.lt.7 handelen over de constructie van matrixspelen 
met voorgeschreven waarde en (gemengde) optimale strategieenruimten. 
Een bestudering van symmetrizeringen van matrix- en bimatrixspelen 
vindt plaats in III.5 en IV.3.8. 
De invloed van storingen der uitbetalingen op waarde, e-optimale stra­
tegieenruimten en e-evenwichtspuntruimten vormt het studieonderwerp 
van II.Τ en IV.3.6. 
In 11.6 komt aan het licht dat de waarde-funktie, gedefinieerd op de 
verzameling bestaande uit de eindige en half-oneindige matrices, ge­
karakteriseerd kan worden door een viertal eigenschappen. 
Een klasse van spelen in uitgebreide vorm, waarvoor de normale vormen 
corresponderen met (half-) oneindige (bi)matrixspelen, wordt behandeld 
in 1.3. 
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STELLINGEN 
I 
Verschillende resjltaten betreffende gemengde uitbreidingen van halfon-
eindige matrixspelen kunnen uitgebreid worden tot gemengde uitbreidin-
gen van tweepersoonsnulsomspelen, waarbij de ene (zuivere) strategieen-
ruimte een eindige verzameling en de andere een willekeurige, niet 
noodzakelijk aftelbare verzameling is. 
II 
Zij <X1 ,X ,. . . »XjjiK- ,K?,. . . ,K> een N-persoonsspel (N e IN) met ein-
dige strategieenruimten X-,X„ XN en met N reëelwaardige uitbe-
talingsfunkties waarvan K„ : X1 x X x ... x Χ ->• ΙΕ naar boven be­
grensd is. Dan heeft de c-gemengde uitbreiding van dit spel ε-even­
wichtspunten voor elke ε > 0. 
[Hieruit volgt, dat men in stelling IV.2.1 van dit proefschrift de 
voorwaarde "B is bounded" kan vervangen door "B is upper bounded" 
zonder de conclusie van deze stelling aan te tasten.] 
III 
Door kleine veranderingen aan te brengen in de bewijzen van [1] kan 
men een nieuw bewijs van de minimaxstelling van J. von Neunann maken. 
[1] Robinson,J., "An iterative method of 
solving a game," Ann.Math. ¿U, 296-301 (1951). 
IV 
[HALFONEINDIGE LINEAIRE PROGRAMMA'S.] 
Voor een begrensde mx^-matrix A (m € IN), een Ъ £ 1 en een с € IB zij 
G (А,Ъ) := {χ e IBm; χ >_ 0, xA >_ Ъ}, 
G2(A,c) := {у € I1 ; у > 0, Ау <. с }, 
ν (А,Ъ,с) := inf xc ,
 2(А,Ъ,с) := sup by . 
xCG^A.b) yeG2(A,c) 
Dan geldt : 
(1) Voor elke m £ IN is er een begrensde mx^-matrix A, een Ъ € 1 en 
een с £ IRm zo dat ν (A,b,c) € IH en СЛЛ.Ъ) = φ. 
(2) Voor elke m € Ш\{ 1} is er een begrensde mx^-matrix A, een b £ 1 en 
een с £ ІНт zo dat ν (A,b,c) £ TR en G2(A,c) = ¿. 
(3) Voor elke m € ΓΝ\{1} is er een begrensde mx^-matrix A, een b £ 1 en 
een с £ IR zo dat -» < ν (А,Ъ,с) < ЛА.Ь.с) < «. 
V 
[HALFONEINDIGE LINEAIRE PROGRAMMA'S.] 
Zij A een begrensde mx<=-matrix (m £ IN), b £ 1 en с £ IR . Zij В het 
symmetrische "x^-matrixspel 
Dan zijn de volgende twee uitspraken equivalent. 
(1) Er is een χ £ ОЛА.Ь) en een y £ GpÍA.c) zo dat 
xc = v^A.b.c) = v2(A,b,c) = by . 
-Ρ 
(2) Vf(B) = 0 en er is een ρ € О (В) met ρ > 0. 
VI 
Zij R een ring en zij ann(a) := {χ £ R; xa = ax = 0} voor elke a £ R. 
Als R geen niet-triviale nilpotente elementen heeft, dan geldt voor 
b -A 0 
elke derivatie D op R: 
(1) D(ann(a)) с ann(a) voor elke а £ R, 
(2) ann(Da) ^ ann(a) voor elke а £ R. 
o 
Er is een derivatie op de ring Z„[X]/(X ) waarvoor (l) en (2) onjuist 
zijn. 
VII 
Zij <Χ,τ> een topologische ruimte. Zij C(X) de lineaire ruimte van 
reëelwaardige continue funkties op X en zij Τ : C(X) •+ C(X) een lineaire 
afbeelding met de eigenschap: 
supp (Tf) с supp (f) voor elke f e C(X). 
[supp (f) := cl {x € X; f(x) φ 0}.] 
Dan is er een g 6 C(X) zo dat Tf = gf voor elke f e C(X). 
PEETRE.J., "Rectification ä l'article <<Une 
caractérisation abstraite des opérateurs 
différentiels»," Math.Scand. Θ, 116-120 (i960). 
VIII 
Opgave 1 op bladzijde 159 van [1] is onjuist. 
[1] DUGUNDJI.J., "Topology," Boston, 
Allyn and Bacon, Inc. (1966). 
IX 
Zij μ een eindige maat op de Borelverzamelingen van IR. Laat f en g 
monotoon niet-dalende μ-integreerbare funkties op IR zijn. Dan bestaat 
/f(x)g(x)du(x) £ (-«,<»] en 
u(IR).;f(x)g(x) dii(x) > ;f(x) dp(x).;g(x) dy(x). 
χ 
[BAMZAAIEN, VUISTEN, KlIOBBELEN.] 
Laat m en η natuurlijke getallen zijn. Bekijk het eindige tweepersoons-
spel В waarvan partijtjes als volgt verlopen: 
m,n 
(1) Speler I en II nemen onzichtbaar voor elkaar respectievelijk i mun­
ten (i б ІИ ) en к munten (k ε ΓΝ ) in de hand. 
m η 
(2) Speler II noemt een getal j £ ΓΝ . 
(3) Speler I noemt een getal 1 € ΓΝ . \{j}. 
m+n 
(h) Speler II betaalt (krijgt) een munt aan (van) speler I als 
i+k = 1 (i+k = j) en er volgt geen uitbetaling als i+k І {j,l}. 
Laten we de waarde van (de gemengde uitbreiding van de normale vorm van) 
В aangeven met ν . Dan geldt: 
m,n m,n 
(a) В is een eerlijk spel (d.w.z. ν =θ) dan en slechts dan als m<n. 
m,n "
 r
 m,n — 
(b) v„ , = τ-, ν . , . . = 'T , ,. voor elke t £ lïï en elke η £ TS, 
2,1 5 t(n+l)-1,n t(n+1) 
lim ν = — - voor elke η £ ΓΝ. 
m,η η+1 
m-*» 
SCHWARTZ,Β.L., "Solution of a set of games," 
Amer.Math.Monthly 66, 693-701 (1959). 
XI 
Het verdient aanbeveling het opnemen van Mathematische Economie in 
studieprogramma's van wiskundestudenten te stimuleren. 
XII 
Bij promoties op een wiskundig onderwerp is de aanwezigheid van een 
schrijfbord wenselijk. 
5 juni 1975 S.H. Tijs. 


